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Politics, Identity, and Class Certification 
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
 
          Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang†  
 
            Forthcoming in 119 MICH. L. REV. 
 
 
     Abstract 
 
This article draws on novel data and presents the results of the first empirical analysis of 
how potentially salient characteristics of Court of Appeals judges influence class certification 
under Rule 23.  We find that the ideological composition of the panel (measured by the party of 
the appointing president) has a very strong association with certification outcomes, with all-
Democratic panels having dramatically higher rates of certification than all-Republican 
panels—nearly triple in about the past twenty years.  We also find that the presence of one 
African American on a panel, and the presence of two females (but not one), is associated with 
pro-certification outcomes.   
 
Our results show that, contrary to conventional wisdom in scholarship on diversity on the 
Courts of Appeal, the impact of diversity extends beyond conceptions of “women’s issues” or 
“minority issues.”  The consequences of gender and racial diversity on the bench, through 
application and elaboration of certification law, radiate widely across the legal landscape, 
influencing implementation of consumer, securities, labor and employment, antitrust, insurance, 
product liability, environmental, and many other areas of law.  In considering possible 
explanations for our findings on the pro-certification preferences of female and African 
American judges, we note that class action doctrine, as trans-substantive procedural law, 
traverses many policy areas.  As strategic actors, it would be rational for judges to take into 
consideration how class certification doctrine in a case that does not implicate issues on which 
they have strong preferences might affect certification in cases that do.  Alternatively, or in 
addition, our results may be the first evidence that trans-substantive procedural law affecting 
access to justice is itself a policy domain in which female and African American judges have 
distinctive preferences.  In either case, the results highlight the importance of exploring the 
effects of diversity on trans-substantive procedural law more generally.   
 
Our findings on gender panel effects in particular are novel in the literature on panel 
effects and the literature on gender and judging.  Past work focusing on substantive anti-
discrimination law found that one woman can influence the votes of males in the majority 
(mirroring what we find with respect to African American judges in class certification decisions).  
These results allowed for optimism that the panel structure—which threatens to dilute the 
influence of underrepresented groups on the bench because they are infrequently in the panel 
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majority—actually facilitates minority influence, whether through deliberation, cue taking, 
bargaining, or some other mechanism.  
 
Our gender results are quite different and normatively troubling.  We observe that 
women have substantially more pro-certification preferences based on outcomes when they are 
in the majority.  However, panels with one female are not more likely to yield pro-certification 
outcomes.  Female majority panels occur at sharply lower rates than women’s percentage of 
judgeships, and thus certification doctrine underrepresents their preferences relative to their 
share of judgeships and overrepresents those of male judges.  
Introduction 
This article explores the relationship between the ideology, gender, and race of U.S. 
Court of Appeals judges and decisions addressing class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  Political conflict over federal judicial nominees has become a familiar 
feature of the American political landscape.  Presidents have increasingly come to regard federal 
judges with aligned preferences as a critical component of the infrastructure for elaborating and 
implementing their national political and policy agendas.  Correspondingly, presidential 
administrations have paid increasing attention to scrutinizing potential nominees in the hopes of 
identifying those with preferences most likely to advance administration goals.  Political 
opponents of presidential administrations are, of course, attentive to the same concerns, and it 
seems that the harder presidents work to nominate ideologically aligned candidates, the harder 
opponents work to defeat them, often characterizing them as ideological extremists.  The focus 
of this battle extends beyond conventional markers of ideology and encompasses issues of 
gender and racial diversity, with some critics attacking presidential administrations for staffing 
the federal courts with judges that fail to reflect the country’s diversity.   
 The concern for gender and racial diversity on the federal bench is often tied to issues of 
representation.  Pitkin’s classic distinction between descriptive and substantive representation is 
useful for clarifying two conceptions of representation that are relevant to racial and gender 
diversity on the bench.1  An institution of governance is descriptively representative to the extent 
that it mirrors, in salient respects, the composition of the community that it governs.  Substantive 
representation, in contrast, is concerned with whether governmental actors, in their decision 
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1 See HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967). 
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making, actually represent the distinctive preferences or interests of a community that they are 
associated with.   
 
Advocates of increasing, and scholars studying, the representation of women and racial 
minorities on the bench have long been concerned with both forms of representation.  One goal 
of increasing diversity on the bench is to create a bench that descriptively reflects the country’s 
diversity, which itself can promote the judiciary’s appearance of impartiality and enhance its 
democratic legitimacy.2  Another purpose concerns legal substance.  Some believe that women 
and racial minority judges have different preferences that are potentially consequential to case 
outcomes, and in particular that they are more sensitive than white males to issues of 
discrimination and inequality in their substantive decision making.3  The primary reason given 
for this view is that women and racial minority judges are more likely to have seen or been 
subjected to discrimination, and these distinctive life experiences make the judges more likely to 
believe a plaintiff′s evidence of discrimination and to empathize with such plaintiffs.4  
Debates over gender and racial diversity in federal judicial appointments have escalated 
in recent years.  In the first two years of his administration, Trump’s judicial appointments were 
92 percent white and 76 percent male.5  One recent study described where this places Trump’s 
appointments in historical context:   
 
Trump has appointed white men in numbers not seen in nearly three decades, 
reversing a four-decade trend across both Democratic and Republican 
administrations of increasing the diversity of judges appointed to the federal bench 
over time.  Among Democratic presidents, the share of white males appointed to 
 
2 See Allison P. Harris and Maya Sen, Bias and Judging, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 241 
(2019); SUSAN B. HAIRE AND LAURA P. MOYER, DIVERSITY MATTERS: JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 
IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS (2015); Susan M. Smith, Diversifying the Judiciary: The 
Influence of Gender and Race on Judging, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 179, 198 (1994); Carl Tobias, The 
Gender Gap on the Federal Bench, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 171, 177 (1990). 
3 See HAIRE AND MOYER, supra note 2, at 6, 13-114; Christina Boyd, Lee Epstein, and 
Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effect of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 389 
(2010); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public 
Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405 (2000); Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on the 
Bench Mean for Justice?, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113 (1999). 
4  See, e.g., HAIRE AND MOYER, supra note 2, at 32, 48; Boyd, Epstein, and Martin, supra 
note 3; Joy Milligan, Pluralism in America: Why Judicial Diversity Improves Legal Decisions 
About. Political Morality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206 (2006); Ifill, supra note 3.  
 
5 See Stacy Hawkins, Trump’s Dangerous Judicial Legacy, 67 U.C.L.A. L. REV. DISC. 
20, 30 (2019). As of January 27, 2020, 50 of Trump’s nominees to the Courts of Appeals had 
been confirmed, of whom 84% were white and 78% were male. There are no African Americans 
in this group. One of them is Hispanic, and seven are Asian-Americans. 
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the bench shrank from 66 percent during Carter’s Administration, to 53 percent 
during Clinton’s administration, and they represented a mere 36 percent of 
Obama’s appointees to the bench.  Republican presidents have appointed more 
white males and fewer diverse judges to the bench compared to Democratic 
presidents.  Until now, however, they too evidenced a trend towards greater judicial 
diversity with the share of white male judges appointed by Reagan at 86 percent, 
but falling to 73 percent under Bush I and falling yet again under Bush II to 67 
percent.  Trump has reversed this decades-long trend by appointing approximately 
70 percent white male judges to the federal bench.6 
Underpinning battles over the ideological, gender, and racial complexion of the federal 
courts as it bears on substantive representation is an empirical assumption: the ideology and 
identity of federal judges matter to how they decide some cases.  It is no wonder, then, that the 
relationship between judge characteristics and judicial decision making is among the largest 
fields of inquiry in the social scientific study of courts.  Scholars have done substantial empirical 
work on the role of ideology, gender, and race in judicial decision making on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals.7  These studies have focused on salient public law issues, including employment 
discrimination, sexual harassment, voting rights, environmental law, affirmative action, abortion, 
capital punishment, campaign finance, and federalism cases, among others.   
However, the field has largely ignored procedural law, including class actions.  Indeed, 
we have not been able to find a single empirical Court of Appeals study seeking to evaluate the 
relationship between these judge characteristics—or any other judge characteristics, or any other 
variables at all—and decisions on class certification.   
This is unfortunate because intuitions about judicial behavior, especially as they relate to 
diversity, often provide a poor guide to reality.  For example, Court of Appeals studies have 
found no differences in decision making by male and female judges in abortion and sexual 
harassment cases,8 or white and racial minority judges in employment discrimination cases,9 or 
 
6 Id. at 31. 
 
7 See, e.g., Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997); Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partnership and 
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 
2155 (1998); Sean Farhang and Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision-Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299 
(2004); Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the 
Federal Appellate Courts, 114 Yale L.J. 1759 (2005); Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, 
Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2008); Boyd, Epstein, and Martin, supra 
note 3; Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 
AM. J. OF POL. SCI 167 (2013); HAIRE AND MOYER, supra note 2. 
 
8 See Boyd, Epstein, and Martin, supra note 3. 
 
9 See Farhang and Wawro, supra note 7; Peresie, supra note 7. 
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Republican and Democratic appointees in cases addressing criminal appeals, governmental 
takings of private property, and Commerce Clause challenges to national legislation.10   
Scholarly neglect of the possible influence of ideology is not surprising, although it is 
regrettable, regarding procedural law in general.  It is more puzzling with respect to class actions 
in particular, which have long been the subject of ideologically inflected debate. Class 
aggregation under Rule 23 can be a vehicle for enormous regulatory power.  Certification has the 
capacity to transform a wage or consumer grievance over modest economic stakes that would 
never be litigated individually into a claim for massive damages when litigated on behalf of a 
class.  In addition to providing the promise of a remedy for large groups of persons when none 
would otherwise be practically available, the prospect of certification can be an important feature 
of the regulatory environment, shaping the behavior of defendants in favor of compliance.   
Our prior work on the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting Federal Rules that 
implicate private enforcement (including Rule 23) shows that beginning in 1995 the justices’ 
votes in such cases were more strongly associated with ideology than they were in merits votes.11  
Particularly given increasing attention to ideology in lower federal court appointments in recent 
decades, our goals in collecting comprehensive data on class action decisions by the Courts of 
Appeals included determining whether ideology plays a similar role at that level.  
The neglect of gender and race as possible influences on class certification decisions may 
reflect the apparent consensus that has emerged in the literature on the Courts of Appeals that 
judges’ gender and race are associated with variation in preferences only in a narrow band of 
cases directly and explicitly implicating discrimination and inequality.12  Our prior work also 
gave cause to question that assumption as to procedural law (like Rule 23) that affects access to 
justice and does so across substantive domains, including in particular discrimination and 
inequality.13 
 
 
10 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN, AND ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE 
JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 149 (2006). 
 
11 In order to reach this conclusion, we compared certification votes to merits votes in the 
same policy areas that underlay our certification cases.  See STEPHEN B. BURBANK AND SEAN 
FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL 
LITIGATION 170-80 (2017). See also Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the 
Counterrevolution against Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1526-28 (2017). 
 
12 See infra, notes 24-29 and accompanying text.  See also Peresie, supra note 7, at 1768 
n.36 (“Although gender differences may exist in judges’ views of procedural doctrines, 
procedural rulings are less likely to be affected by a judge’s gender.”). 
 
13 Recognition of this reality did, however, cause two scholars to assimilate some 
procedural rulings to merits rulings. See Sepehr Shahshahani and Lawrence Liu, Religion and 
Judging on the Federal Court of Appeals, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 716, 723 (2017) (“Our 
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In Part I, we briefly review the literature on Court of Appeals decision making that we 
build on.  We emphasize two points.  First, the literature shows that when Court of Appeals 
judges’ party, gender, and race are associated with votes, their primary explanatory power is at 
the panel-level, meaning that the composition of the panel often explains more variation in 
judges’ votes than their own individual characteristics.  The key point is that Court of Appeals 
judges’ preferences (measured by characteristics) may influence outcomes by the way they 
influence the votes of co-panelists.   
 
Second,  studies focusing on discrete types of civil rights claims show that panels with 
one woman or African American judge are more likely to produce pro-civil rights outcomes as 
compared to all-male or all-white panels, providing systematic evidence that minority group 
judges may influence outcomes even when they are in the panel minority.  By “minority group” 
we refer to groups of judges that are a numerical minority on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, such as 
women and nonwhites, regardless of their numbers in the general population.  We use the phrase 
“panel minority” to refer to a minority position on a panel that has divided preferences, 
regardless of whether the judge is in a majority or minority group on the circuit.   
 
In Part II, we review the theoretical accounts of appellate decision making that provide 
possible explanations for panel dynamics when judges in the panel minority in terms of 
preferences do and do not affect outcomes.  This theoretical literature is built on the empirical 
fact that Court of Appeals panels are overwhelmingly unanimous.  On one account, unanimity 
may be driven by dissent avoidance by panel minority judges who disagree with panel majorities 
but do not dissent because of workload pressures, strong norms against dissent, or the loneliness 
of dissent.  These factors could lead to suppression of dissents on panels on which there is 
sincere disagreement, and the panel majority view prevails without being influenced by the panel 
minority.   
Alternatively, unanimity may be driven by panel minorities not dissenting because they 
are able to affect decisions.  Mechanisms of influence include deliberation and bargaining, 
which allow panel minorities to change the preferences and/or votes of panel majorities.  As 
applied to minority group judges, this view yields more positive normative implications than if 
they were suppressing dissents.  It would allow minority group preferences, when they differ 
systematically from majority group preferences, to shape the application and development of law 
even when they are in the panel minority.  As already noted, multiple studies focused on civil 
rights cases have found that a single woman or African American can influence the votes of 
males and whites.      
Part III contains our core contributions.  We rely on an original and comprehensive 
dataset of Court of Appeals panel decisions addressing whether or not to certify a class under 
Rule 23 that spans 1967 to 2017.  We find a very strong association between the political party 
 
object is to gauge the attitude of judges to religious liberties claims, and there is no reason to 
think that this attitude becomes uninteresting or entirely different when the issue before the court 
is procedural. Quite the opposite, we know that judges use procedural doctrines to achieve 
substantive outcomes they desire.”).  This study, however, provided no separate analysis of 
procedural issues, and thus it does not allow inferences about whether their outcomes were 
associated with judge characteristics.   
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of the appointing President and certification votes and outcomes, with all-Democratic panels 
yielding pro-certification outcomes at nearly triple the rate of all-Republican panels over about 
the past twenty years.  Comparing the descriptive levels of ideological voting in our certification 
data to prior scholarship focused on substantive law, we show that the role of ideology in 
certification is comparable in size to its role in cases presenting some of the most ideologically 
contentious issues of our day, including, for example, capital punishment, employment 
discrimination, desegregation, and abortion.  If the judicial behavior literature’s neglect of 
procedure in general, and class certification in particular, reflects an assumption that the effects 
of judicial ideology do not reach into this domain on the Courts of Appeals, we show that 
assumption to be false.     
This Part goes on to show that racial and gender diversity on panels is also consequential 
to certification, although we discern important differences between the race and gender dynamics 
on panels.  The presence of a single African American on a panel, relative to none, increases the 
probability that the panel will yield a pro-certification outcome.  This result is consistent with the 
race and gender panel effects studies in which a single African American or female judge on a 
panel is associated with increases in the probability of pro-civil rights outcomes.  We have an 
insufficient number of cases with two African Americans on a panel to assess the probability of 
pro-certification outcomes on such panels. 
  
In notable contrast, the presence of a single female on a panel, relative to none, is not 
associated with an increased probability of a pro-certification outcome.  This does not mean, 
however, that women do not have more pro-certification preferences.  When two women serve 
on a panel, forming a majority, its rate of pro-certification outcomes is much larger than on all-
male panels.  This result departs sharply from conventional wisdom in the Court of Appeals 
literature that when women or racial minorities have different preferences than male and white 
judges, some pathway (or pathways) allows them to influence outcomes when in the minority.   
 
We regard this result as normatively troubling. As a function of the laws of probability, 
minority group judges on a circuit will be in the majority on panels at rates far lower than their 
fraction of judgeships.  The share of female majority panels in our data is about half the share of 
individual votes cast by women.  The majoritarian character of gender panel dynamics in 
certification decisions—where women in the panel minority do not influence the outcome votes 
of men in the majority, and women’s impact emerges only when they are in the majority—
materially dilutes women’s influence on certification relative to their numbers on the bench, a 
bench that already underrepresents women.   
 
These results highlight some important limits of Court of Appeals scholarship which 
concludes that, in many discrete policy areas, women and racial minority judges do not have 
different preferences than male and white judges.  The inferences in these studies (every one that 
we have found) were drawn from empirical models in which, like our gender results, the 
individual-level votes of minority group judges were not different from majority group judges 
and/or the presence of one minority group judge did not produce distinguishable outcomes 
relative to all-majority group panels, but the researchers did not separately evaluate panels with a 
majority of minority group judges.   
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Earlier studies appear to have assumed that, if minority group judges had different 
preferences than majority group judges, they would affect minority group judge votes, or case 
outcomes, rather than being suppressed by majoritarian voting dynamics (or some other 
mechanism).  Our gender results show that this assumption is sometimes false, and thus 
differences in minority group judges’ preferences cannot be rejected without separately 
examining cases in which they are in the majority. Unfortunately, meaningful analysis for that 
purpose requires a lot of data.  
 
Neither our data nor prior panel effects scholarship allow us to identify the reasons for 
female and African American judges’ different preferences as to class certification or, in the case 
of gender, why two women on a panel as opposed to one are associated with higher rates of pro-
certification voting and outcomes. We do, however, offer suggestions on both questions as a 
possible guide for additional research. 
  
As trans-substantive procedural law, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply across 
substantive domains and can enable or constrict access to justice.  A controlling interpretation of 
a Federal Rule in an antitrust case, for example, will carry over into its application in a voting 
rights case.  One important insight of this Article is that the trans-substantive nature of the 
Federal Rules can also convey the substantive effects of diversity across the landscape of 
American regulatory law.  Court of Appeals judges understand that the Federal Rules are trans-
substantive, as are the effects of some Federal Rules (importantly including Rule 23) on the 
enforcement of substantive law. As strategic actors, it would be rational for them to take into 
consideration how class certification doctrine in a case that does not implicate issues on which 
they have strong preferences might affect certification in cases that do.  Alternatively, or in 
addition, our results may be the first evidence that trans-substantive procedural law affecting 
access to justice is itself a policy domain in which female and African American judges have 
distinctive preferences.     
 
Our suggestions regarding mechanisms that may help to explain why two women on a 
panel, but not one, are associated with higher rates of pro-certification voting and outcomes are 
more speculative and tentative. One explanation is familiar in the literature on panel effects.  
Male judges may simply care intensely about certification and have views so entrenched that 
their votes cannot be influenced, and majoritarian dynamics prevail.  Yet, we observe that a 
single African American is associated with elevating the rate of pro-certification outcomes.  This 
leads us to consider recent scholarship on the gender gap in political discussions and decision 
making, which suggests some disquieting possibilities. If the dynamics identified by this research 
are at play, one possibility is that a female judge in the minority who advocates for a preferred 
outcome is less successful because, as a panel minority in a substantive domain that does not 
elicit gender-based deference, she is regarded as less authoritative and influential.  Another is 
that the reinforcement of a female majority increases her propensity to advocate preferences that 
differ systematically from those of her male colleagues in areas without obvious gender salience.  
I. Panel Effects on the Court of Appeals 
 From the dawn of the judicial behavior literature until the late 1990s, judicial politics 
scholars studied such questions on appellate courts by evaluating, for example, whether a judge’s 
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presumed ideological preferences (as proxied by the party of the appointing president), race, or 
gender was associated with her votes in cases thought to have high policy salience.  These 
studies were based largely on the attitudinal model of decision making.14  The attitudinal model 
is oriented to explaining judicial decision making based on “each judge’s political ideology and 
the identity of the parties.”15 This individualist orientation emphasizes the explanatory power of 
each judge’s sincere preferences independently of strategic institutional considerations or of 
interactions with colleagues. 
Beginning with landmark studies by Revesz16 and Cross and Tiller,17 scholars discovered 
that the votes of judges on three-judge Court of Appeals panels in many salient policy areas are 
associated with the identity characteristics of their panel colleagues.  These initial studies found 
that Court of Appeals judges’ votes were influenced by the party of the appointing president of 
other judges on the panel.18 These insights into panel dynamics were then extended to work on 
the influence of judges’ gender and race.  A number of studies found that in employment 
discrimination cases, males serving on three-judge Court of Appeals panels with one female 
colleague were more likely to rule for the plaintiff than men serving on all male panels.19  
Similarly, one study found that in voting rights cases white judges on an appellate panel were 
more likely to vote in favor of liability when sitting with one racial minority judge,20 and another 
found that in affirmative action cases white judges were more likely to vote in the pro-
affirmative action direction when sitting with one African American on the panel.21   
 
14 See JEFFREY SEGAL AND HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
 
15 Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate 
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265 (1997). 
 
16 Revesz, supra note 7. 
 
17 Cross and Tiller, supra note 7.  
 
18 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10; FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING ON THE U.S. 
COURT OF APPEALS (2007). 
 
19 See Farhang and Wawro, supra note 7; Peresie, supra note 7; Boyd, Epstein, and 
Martin, supra note 3. 
 
20 See Cox and Miles, supra note 7, at 45. 
 
21 See Kastellec, supra note 7. A recent study focusing on judges’ religion, however, 
shows that panel effects will not always be present when there are detectable individual-level 
differences in preferences across groups.  The study found that, although Jewish judges on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals were more likely to rule for the plaintiff in establishment clause cases, 
the votes of non-Jewish colleagues on the panel were not affected. See Shahshahani & Liu, supra 
note 12.  
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In the next section, when outlining a theoretical framework for understanding potential 
panel dynamics in the face of disagreement, we assume that in some areas of law systematic 
differences exist in preferences across groups of Court of Appeals judges, such as Democratic 
versus Republican appointees, whites versus non-whites (or other racial subsets), or men versus 
women.  We make this stylized assumption because it is the purpose of the framework to help 
understand the processes through which differences in preferences on panels are associated with 
legal outcomes, including differences in preferences associated with judges’ identity 
characteristics such as race and gender.  By assuming that judges’ race and gender may be 
associated with their views of the proper disposition of cases in some fields of law, we do not 
indulge the facile notion that women or racial minority judges have homogeneous preferences.  
We do not believe that there is a monolithic women’s perspective, or racial minority perspective, 
among judges.  We do believe, however, that in some domains of law race and gender may be 
one constitutive element of a judge’s views.  The same is true of ideology.22 
The social scientific evidence relied on throughout this article provides support for this 
view.  Yet, as previously noted, research on the U.S. Courts of Appeals civil docket that finds 
variation along gender or racial lines has clustered heavily in areas relating to discrimination and 
inequality, and such variation has sometimes been absent even in those areas.23  In Boyd, 
Epstein, and Martin’s widely cited study on gender, they undertake discrete analyses of the 
 
   
22 See Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: 
An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1322 n. 11 (“The fact that 
judges’ votes are correlated with party affiliation does not mean that they are not following legal 
doctrine. Legal rules are inevitably ‘open textured,’ allowing for the exercise of judgment. In 
those areas where legal discretion exists, judges may pursue policy goals without necessarily 
violating legal norms.”); BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 11, at 149-50 (“To attribute the 
Court’s decisions exclusively to the ideological preferences of the justices, however, would 
neglect ‘the messiness of lived experience’ … which teaches that judges … make decisions 
based on a number of considerations, including the law as they understand it.”). 
 
23 See Farhang and Wawro, supra note 7 (finding that judge's gender, but not race, is 
associated with more liberal voting and outcomes in employment discrimination claims on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals); Peresie, supra note 7 (same); Cox and Miles, supra note 7 (finding that 
a judge’s race, but not gender, is associated with higher likelihood of voting in favor of liability 
in voting rights cases on the U.S. Courts of Appeals); Kastellec, supra note 7 (finding that a 
judge’s race, but not gender, is associated with higher likelihood of voting in favor of affirmative 
action programs on the U.S. Courts of Appeals); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew P. 
Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious 
Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 595-96 (2004) (finding that a judge’s race, but not 
gender, is associated with higher likelihood of voting in favor of plaintiffs alleging religious 
discrimination on the U.S. Courts of Appeals); HAIRE AND MOYER, supra note 2, 28-32 (finding 
that African American judges do not vote more liberally than white judges on the Courts of 
Appeals when data is pooled over many policy areas, but they do in employment discrimination 
cases if the data is restricted to claims based upon race, and (weakly) in criminal cases). 
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association of Court of Appeals judges’ gender and their votes in thirteen separate policy areas.24  
They report that female judges vote differently than male judges in only one—gender-based 
employment discrimination claims.25  
They find that female judges do not vote differently than male judges in numerous areas 
that have no explicit gender salience and do not explicitly implicate issues of discrimination, 
such as campaign finance, federalism, piercing the corporate veil, Takings Clause, and 
environmental cases.  Perhaps more surprisingly to some observers, they also find that female 
judges do not vote differently than male judges in some areas that do implicate gender and 
discrimination, including abortion, sexual harassment, and affirmative action.  Ultimately, their 
interpretation is that female judges vote differently, and influence male judges, in domains in 
which they “possess unique and valuable information emanating from shared professional 
experiences.”26  Surveying the literature on gender and judging, and reporting the results from 
their own large-scale study, Haire and Moyer similarly conclude that “issues of sex 
discrimination” are “the single exception” to the general rule that “women judges … decide 
cases similarly to their male colleagues.”27   
II. Institutional Structure on the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Norm of Unanimity 
The panel effects literature makes clear that understanding decision making on the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals requires attention to the institutional context of three-judge appellate panels.  
This is especially true when studying the influence of a minority group on the appellate bench.  
By “minority group” we refer to groups of judges that are a numerical minority on the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, such as women and nonwhites, regardless of their numbers in the general 
population.  We use the phrase “panel minority” to refer to a minority position on a panel that 
has divided preferences, regardless of whether the judge is in a majority or minority group on the 
circuit.  In federal trial courts, a minority group trial judge sitting alone has the authority to 
decide a case as she sees fit (with the obvious constraint of appellate review).  On three-judge 
appellate panels, where a simple majority prevails, a single minority group judge sitting with two 
 
24 See Boyd, Epstein, and Martin, supra note 3, at 400–06. 
 
25 Several other studies find that women are more pro-plaintiff in adjudicating 
employment discrimination claims in general, not just gender-based claims.  See Donald R. 
Songer, Sue Davis and Susan Haire, A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: 
Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals,  56 J. POL. 425 (1994); Farhang and Wawro, supra note 
7; Peresie, supra note 7; Boyd, Epstein, and Martin provide no test of employment 
discrimination claims in general.   
   
26 Id. at 391–92.  It seems that an informational explanation for women’s different 
preferences, and their influence on men, in employment discrimination cases in their data (which 
exclude sexual harassment cases) should extend to sexual harassment cases (which are 
overwhelmingly employment discrimination claims).   
 
27 HAIRE AND MOYER, supra note 2, 48.  
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members of the majority group lacks the power to decide anything.  The two judges in the 
majority group are free to issue binding decisions that wholly reject the views of the minority. 
This is normatively significant in the Court of Appeal context because the frequency with 
which a circuit minority will constitute a panel majority is materially lower than their 
representation on the circuit.  For example, under random assignment in a circuit with 15 judges, 
of whom two are racial minorities (13 percent), the probability of drawing a panel that has two 
racial minority judges is about three percent.  If three members of the circuit are women (20 
percent), only eight percent of panels will be majority female.28  Only when a group approaches 
half of the appellate bench will its members be in the majority about half the time.  As compared 
with trial courts, in which each case is heard by one judge, the use of three-judge appellate 
panels threatens to significantly diminish the influence of minority group judges in areas in 
which minority and majority views differ systematically.  In Pitkin′s terms, appellate panels may 
dilute translation of descriptive representation into substantive representation.29 
This bleak consequence of appellate court structure seems the likely outcome in fields of 
law characterized by differences in preferences across majority and minority group judges if: (1) 
judges’ preferences on case disposition are not affected by their colleagues on the panel, and (2) 
they vote their sincere preferences.  In that event, majority group judges will decide those cases 
in the same way regardless of whether their majority is 3-0 or 2-1.  Where the panel is split 2-1 
in favor of the majority group, the decision of the majority group judges will not be influenced 
by the minority group judge.  The minority group view will prevail only in cases in which two or 
three minority judges are assigned to the panel.  Finally, this simple theoretical account predicts 
higher rates of dissent among minority group judges when they serve with two majority group 
judges, and among majority group judges in the rare cases in which they serve with two minority 
group judges. 
Median voter behavior on appellate panels would yield the same result.  Under this view, 
“it is the preferences of the median member of the judicial panel that should determine the 
panel’s decision.”30  Under the stylized conditions assumed above, on panels with two majority 
group judges and one minority group judge, a majority group judge will always be the median, 
and minority group judges therefore will not influence outcomes unless they are in the majority 
on the panel.  Again, we would expect to see higher rates of dissent by panel minorities (whether 
they are a majority or minority group judge).   
 
28 This result comes from the hypergeometric distribution.   
 
29 See PITKIN, supra note 1. 
 
30 See Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from 
Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 74 (2002); see also Eric R. Claeys, The Article III, 
Section 2 Game: A Game-Theoretic Account of Standing and Other Justiciability Doctrines, 67 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1321 (1994). 
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Moving from stylized theory to empirical reality, decisions by federal appellate panels 
are in fact overwhelmingly unanimous, with dissent rates aggregated across all circuits averaging 
approximately 3% to 9%, varying over time and with respect to issue area.31  These low dissent 
rates prevail even within particularly contentious issue areas, where measures of panel outcomes 
are highly correlated with ideology.  That is, even in substantive areas of law characterized by 
systematic ideological disagreement among Court of Appeals judges across cases, within cases 
the same judges achieve a remarkably high level of unanimity.  The evidence thus suggests that 
panel unanimity masks disagreement among panel members. 
What happens to the views of the panel minority on divided panels?  Are panel minority 
dissents being suppressed without influencing the content of the panel′s decision?  Or are panel 
minority dissents avoided through a process in which minority judges influence the content of 
the panel decision?  A variety of theories have been advanced to explain panel unanimity, which 
is sufficiently prevalent that scholars regard it as a “norm” on the U.S. Courts of Appeals.32  
A. Suppressed Dissent Explanations for the Norm of Unanimity  
One set of explanations suggests that Court of Appeals judges often acquiesce in (join) 
opinions with which they disagree while having no influence on their substance.  Unanimity is 
maintained in the face of disagreement due to (1) workload pressures, (2) a coercive consensus 
norm, or (3) the loneliness of dissent.  These explanations have been referred to collectively as 
“suppressed dissent” hypotheses for the unanimity norm on the Courts of Appeals.33   
First, many Court of Appeals judges face substantial workloads. Having peaked in 2006, 
filings averaged 335 per judge in active service in 2010.34  Facing heavy workloads simply to 
 
31 See VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST, AND WENDY L. MARTINEK, 
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 47 
(2006); Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter?: A Case Study, 94 
NW. U. L. REV.1409, 1430 n.120 (2000); DONALD SONGER, REGINALD SHEEHAN, AND SUSAN 
HAIRE, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 105 (2000); 
Burton M. Atkins and Justin J. Green, Consensus on the United States Courts of Appeals: 
Illusion or Reality?, 20 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 735 (1976). 
 
32 See Kim, supra note 24, at 1331; CROSS, supra note 16, at 160; SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra 
note 10, at 69; John P. McIver, Scaling Judicial Decisions: The Panel Decision-Making Process 
of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 20 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 749, 757 (1976). 
 
33 Farhang and Wawro, supra note 7, at 306. For a thoughtful recent discussion of dissent 
in multi-membered courts by a federal appellate judge, see Bernice B. Donald, Judicial 
Independence, Collegiality, and the Problem of Dissent in Multi-Member Courts, 94 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 317 (2019). 
 
34 See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case 
Management in The Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 324 (2011). This declined to 292 in 2018. 
See e-mail from Marin Levy to Stephen Burbank (June 9, 2019). As Professor Levy 
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write majority opinions that they are assigned to author, Court of Appeals judges have observed 
that it is often not feasible for nonwriting judges to invest time to influence the content of 
opinions that they join.35  This is consistent with the notion that heavy caseloads on the Courts of 
Appeals are associated with disproportionate deference to opinion authors regarding opinion 
content.36  In such an environment, Court of Appeals judges are often constrained from taking on 
the extra work of writing dissents, which they of course recognize will not directly influence 
circuit law.37  Hence, the absence of dissents does not arise from panel consensus, but rather 
judges who disagree lack the time or resources needed to record a dissent. 
Second, according to the coercive consensus norm, “social pressure exists … for the 
judge to adhere to the dominant value or position expressed in a decision.”38  Some contend that 
this norm is rooted in the view that unanimous opinions promote the appearance of legal 
objectivity, certainty, and neutrality, which promotes courts’ institutional legitimacy, while 
dissenting opinions create legal uncertainty, erode courts’ credibility, and may diminish 
compliance.39  Even absent explicit pressure, such institutional concerns may cause judges to 
forego dissents out of a sense of “organizational loyalty.”40 
 
acknowledges, this is “an imperfect measure of workload,” because “it does not account for the 
contribution of senior judges, and therefore overestimates. It also does not account for the 
number of vacancies on the court, and therefore can underestimate.” Id. 
 
35 See FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL 
APPELLATE BENCH 178 (1980); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About 
Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1242, 1262 (2006). 
 
36 See Sean Farhang, Jonathan P. Kastellec, and Gregory J. Wawro, The Politics of 
Opinion Assignment and Authorship on the Us Court of Appeals: Evidence from Sexual 
Harassment Cases, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 559, 562 (2015); Steven A. Peterson, Dissent in American 
Courts, 43 J. OF POL. 412, 415–16 (1981). 
 
37 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 65–66; Donald R. Songer, Factors Affecting 
Rates of Dissent in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, in JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS: 
BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN APPELLATE COURTS 117 (Sheldon Goldman and Charles M. 
Lamb eds., 1986); Atkins and Green, supra note 33. 
 
38 Burton M. Atkins, Judicial Behavior and Tendencies Towards Conformity in a Three 
Member Small Group: A Case Study of Dissent Behavior on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 54 SOC. 
SCI. Q. 41, 43 (1973); see also SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 65–66. 
 
39 See HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 33, at 19; Farhang and Wawro, supra note 7, at 307; 
Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1639, 1651 (2003). 
 
40 Peterson, supra note 38, at 416–17. 
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Third, some scholars maintain that judges who disagree with a panel decision may refrain 
from dissent, in part, because of the “intrinsic loneliness of dissent.”41  As the size of the court 
increases, so does the possibility for dissenters to join together and express collective 
disagreement, making dissent more collegial and appealing.42  Thus, the three-judge panel, 
where dissents are always solitary, is the institutional environment in which the loneliness of 
dissent is most likely consequential as a mechanism contributing to panel unanimity.43 
To the extent that any or all of the suppressed dissent hypotheses are operative, 
institutional conditions on the Courts of Appeals may inhibit panel minorities who disagree with 
panel majorities from articulating disagreement.  Within areas of law where the views of 
majority and minority group judges differ systematically, this would produce normatively 
troubling results.  Panel unanimity would be masking two things: (1) the failure of minority 
group judges to shape the application and development of law proportionately with their 
numbers on the Court of Appeals, and (2) the disproportionate suppression of the dissenting 
views of minority group judges.44    
B. Modified Content Explanations for the Norm of Unanimity 
There is another set of explanations for the high degree of unanimity on the Courts of 
Appeals, which contemplates that withholding of dissents by panel minorities entails 
modification of the majority opinion in the direction of the would-be dissenter’s preferences.  
This view yields more positive normative implications for how minority group preferences, 
when they differ systematically from majority group preferences, are mediated into the 
application and development of law.  The explanations are (1) deliberation, (2) cue taking, and 
(3) bargaining.  We refer to these explanations for the norm of unanimity, collectively, as 
“modified content” explanations.45  In contrast with a simple majoritarian model of appellate 
 
41 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 64–71; see Farhang and Wawro, supra note 7, at 
307; Donald R. Songer, Consensual and Nonconsensual Decisions in Unanimous Opinions of the 
United States Court of Appeals, 26 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 225, 227 (1982). 
 
42 See Sydney Ulmer, Toward a Theory of Sub-Group Formation in the United States 
Supreme Court, 27 J. OF POL. 133 (1965); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL 
STRATEGY (1964). 
 
43 See Justin J. Green and Burton M. Atkins, Designated Judges: How Well Do They 
Perform?, 61 JUDICATURE 358, 368 (1978). 
 
44 We say disproportionate suppression because, as a result of the hypergeometric 
function described above, minority judges will be in the panel minority, relative to their 
percentage of seats, much more than judges comprising a larger share of seats.  Thus, if any of 
the suppressed dissent hypotheses is correct, the silencing effect will fall most heavily on 
minority groups. 
 
45 Farhang and Wawro, supra note 7, at 308. 
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panels, where each judge’s preferences are unaffected by their colleagues and all vote to decide 
according to their sincere preferences, now a lone judge in the minority is able to influence 
application and development of law on the Court of Appeals. Of course, leading colleagues to 
change their votes on outcome is the strongest form of content modification. 
The deliberative explanation for panel effects is about rational persuasion through the 
exchange of ideas and information.  Judges take the perspectives, arguments, and information 
presented by one another seriously in the deliberative process, and this can cause judges on a 
heterogeneous panel, who exchange information and arguments from a wider range of 
perspectives than occur on a homogeneous panel, to change their views in the course of 
deliberations.46  The contention that this process explains panel effects is anchored in two 
premises.  The first is that the judge characteristic producing the panel effect (such as ideology, 
race, or gender) will be associated with bringing distinctive perspectives, arguments, and 
information to bear in the deliberative process.  As Sunstein et al. put it, a more diverse panel 
will likely have a larger “argument pool” than a more homogeneous one, meaning that a wider 
range of arguments “are far more likely to emerge and to be pressed.” 47   
The second premise is that when a panel is divided 2-1 regarding the best disposition, the 
two members of the panel majority can be persuaded with arguments and information provided 
by the single minority judge to decide differently than they would in her absence.  According to 
Sunstein et al., “group polarization” on three-judge panels, where like-minded judges on 
homogeneous panels reinforce one another’s positions and go to extremes, can be mitigated by 
persuasive arguments and information offered by the panel minority.  Breaking “group 
polarization” involves the process of persuasion through the introduction of arguments and 
information that would otherwise be absent. 48  Panel effects may thus be explained by “rational 
persuasion within the group” causing the majority to change its assessment of “the best 
understanding of the law” (or facts).49   
The panel characteristics that were the focus of these arguments by Sunstein et al., Cross, 
and Edwards were based on the political party of appointing presidents.  The deliberative 
account was offered to explain why, for example, two judges appointed by Republicans sitting 
with a judge appointed by a Democrat decide more moderately than three judges appointed by 
Republicans.  Sunstein et al. in particular regard it as a normatively desirable feature of appellate 
panels that they can mitigate decision making characterized by “group polarization” on 
 
46 See Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in 
Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1993); Edwards, supra note 40; SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra 
note 10. 
 
47 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 76. 
 
48 Id. at 71–73. 
 
49 CROSS, supra note 20, at 154–55; see also Edwards, supra note 41, at 1656–61; 
SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 73. 
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homogeneous panels (all Republican or all Democratic).  The same logic can be applied to the 
gender or racial diversity of panels to explain panel effects.  In some types of cases, women and 
racial minorities may bring distinctive perspectives or information to bear in the deliberative 
process and persuade male or white judges to decide differently than they would on all-male or 
all-white panels.50  
Another mechanism that scholars have offered to explain panel effects is “cue taking.”  
Cue taking is a dynamic whereby some judges, seeking an efficient path to rendering a decision, 
show greater deference to other judges in issue domains in which they are perceived to be more 
credible or expert.51  Although this mechanism does not seem to be a plausible explanation for 
party-panel effects, it has been invoked to explain gender-panel effects in “gender-coded 
cases.”52  Social psychological research has found that in areas in which men perceive women as 
more knowledgeable, they are more prone to defer to their judgment.53  The studies finding 
gender-panel effects have examined employment discrimination cases, and several of them have 
proposed cue taking as a plausible explanation.54  A study finding race-panel effects in 
affirmative action cases also proposed something akin to cue taking as a possible explanatory 
mechanism.55 
We see this account as potentially complementary to the deliberative explanation for 
panel effects associated with minority group judges.  Like the deliberative explanation, cue 
taking can include the notion that in some policy domains minority group judges have different 
preferences, take different positions in panel deliberations, and influence majority group judges.  
The difference is that cue taking theory suggests a cognitive process of deference to perceived 
 
50 See Farhang and Wawro, supra note 7, at 308; Kastellec, supra note 7, at 171. 
 
51 See DAVID KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 31 
(2002). 
 
52 Peresie, supra note 7, at 1783. 
 
53 See Marlaine E. Lockheed, Sex and Social Influence: A Meta-Analysis Guided by 
Theory, in STATUS, REWARDS, AND INFLUENCE: HOW EXPECTATIONS ORGANIZE BEHAVIOR, 409–
10 (Joseph Berger and Morris Zelditch, Jr. eds., 1985); Barbara Meeker and Patricia A. Weitzel-
O’Neill, Sex Roles and Interpersonal Behavior in Task-Oriented Groups, in STATUS, REWARDS, 
AND INFLUENCE: HOW EXPECTATIONS ORGANIZE BEHAVIOR, 390–91 (Joseph Berger and Morris 
Zelditch, Jr. eds., 1985). 
 
54 See Peresie, supra note 7, at 1783–84; Boyd, Epstein, and Martin, supra note 3, at 392. 
 
55 See Kastellec, supra note 7, at 171–72 (observing that the mere presence of an African 
American judge in an affirmative action case, independent of the content of deliberations, and 
independent of her vote, may influence the behavior of white judges on the panel).  Boyd, 
Epstein, and Martin, supra note 3, at 392 n.8, suggest the same possibility with respect to gender, 
and they liken this to cue taking. 
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credibility and expertise rather than pure rational evaluation of the perspective offered (although 
of course deference to expertise can be rational).  We agree with scholars who posit that the most 
plausible account of cue taking by Court of Appeals judges is that they give greater weight to the 
views of judges they regard as more credible and expert, rather than following them with abject 
deference.56  Thus, if the deliberative account is operative, and if white and male judges view 
their racial minority and female panel colleagues as having greater expertise in race and gender-
coded cases, then the cue taking effect would heighten and reinforce the deliberative effect. 
The bargaining explanation for panel effects contemplates that panel minorities, aided by 
the norm of unanimity, extract concessions from panel majorities, rather than changing their 
minds.  Contrary to the deliberative explanation, the panel minority does not change the 
majority’s “best understanding of the law.”  Rather, panel majorities strategically change their 
position in a bargaining process calculated to avert a dissent and achieve unanimity.   
In work on strategic judicial behavior, scholars have found considerable evidence that 
Supreme Court justices are often willing to bargain away from their ideal positions for the 
purpose of enlarging the coalition of justices who will join an opinion.57  Similar dynamics have 
been observed on three-judge federal appellate panels.58  These studies focused on strategic 
concessions by judges necessary to achieve a majority.  It is also plausible that concessions will 
be made to enlarge a majority (beyond a bare majority) by judges who value the appearance of 
apolitical and neutral decision making, who want to promote legal clarity and predictability, or 
who are concerned about compliance.59   
A related but distinct idea is that would-be dissenters can threaten to “blow the whistle” 
(with a dissent) on a majority if it strays from governing law, thereby attracting appellate review.  
With this threat the panel minority can gain concessions in opinion content.60  It is a form of 
bargaining, but the majority’s goal is to avoid reversal rather than to secure institutional goals of 
legitimacy, clarity or compliance.  This tactic may be most likely to work when the panel 
 
56 See Edward Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 559 
(2008). 
 
57 See LEE EPSTEIN AND JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1995); FORREST 
MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS, AND PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME 
COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000); see also MURPHY, supra note 33. 
 
58 See Ryan J. Owens and Ryan C. Black, Strategic Bargaining on the United States 
Courts of Appeals, presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Toronto, Canada (2009). 
 
59 See HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 33, at 19; Edwards, supra note 41, at 1651; 
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 107–08 (1997). 
  
60 See Cross and Tiller, supra note 7. 
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majority is ideologically distant from the circuit en banc or the Supreme Court.61  Whether 
concessions are motivated by the institutional costs of dissents, or by fear of reversal, “[s]ince 
judges often desire unanimity or, at least, as large a majority as possible, the threat of dissent can 
be used to gain” them.”62 
If any of these modified content explanations is operative, panel unanimity need not 
entail suppression of dissents.  Instead, high levels of unanimity would result from substantive 
modifications of the panel majority’s initial view of a case based upon deliberation, cue taking, 
or bargaining.  As applied to issues on which majority and minority group judges differ 
systematically, the actual operation of modified content explanations would yield optimistic 
conclusions about the substantive representation of minority group judges.  In contrast with a 
scenario in which panel outcomes reflect simple majoritarian processes, or dominance of the 
median, institutional features of appellate panels would function to facilitate rather than impede 
substantive minority representation. 
 The panel effects studies discussed above relating to race (affirmative action and voting 
rights cases) and gender (employment discrimination cases) were consistent with modified 
content explanations, although they could not determine which explanatory mechanism(s) were 
at work.63  A single African American sitting with two white judges, and a single woman sitting 
with two men, affected the votes of majority group judges in favor of affirmative action, liability 
under the Voting Rights Act, and employment discrimination plaintiffs.  Within case types in 
which there are systematic differences in preferences across groups of judges—Democrats 
versus Republicans, women versus men, African Americans versus whites—three-judge Court of 
Appeals panels frequently do not operate on a simple majoritarian principle under which judges 
vote their preferences independently from their interactions with others on the panel.  Instead, in 
some types of cases, judges in the ideological, gender, or racial minority are able to influence the 
votes of the panel majority.    
C. Two Types of Panel Effects 
The forgoing discussion of suppressed dissent and modified content theories highlights 
that there are two types of panel effects.  As observed by Professor Kim with respect to ideology, 
 
61 See Jonathan P. Kastellec, Hierarchical and Collegial Politics on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 73 J. OF POL. 345 (2011); Kim, supra note 24. 
 
62 Peterson, supra note 38, at 418. 
 
63 See Kastellec, supra note 7, at 172 (“some suggestive evidence that votes alone do not 
seem to be the main mechanism underlying the effects I uncover”); Kastellec, supra note 18 
(results support both internal and external mechanisms). See also Shahshahani & Liu, supra note 
13, at 739(“[O]ur finding suggests that panel effects (where they do exist) cannot come entirely 
through the minority judge’s threat of voting the other way because such an explanation cannot 
account for an individual characteristic that changes the minority judge’s vote but not the co-
panelists’.”) 
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“the phenomenon of ‘panel effects’ encompasses two distinct effects: first, that judges in the 
majority vote differently (in a less stereotypically ideological fashion) than judges on a 
homogeneous panel; and second, that judges in the minority vote differently (still less 
stereotypically ideologically) than judges in the majority.”64  Sunstein et al. characterize the first 
of these—the ability of the minority to draw the majority toward her—as an “ideological 
dampening” effect, relative to the tendency of unified panels to go to extremes.65    
Although it is possible that the two types of panel effects will occur together—with the 
majority and minority reciprocally panel affecting one another—it is not logically necessary that 
they will.  Sunstein et al. argue that ideological dampening of majorities by minorities will vary 
across policy domains and is less likely to occur in those, such as abortion and capital 
punishment, in which judges have intense and “entrenched” preferences, undercutting the ability 
of partisan panel minorities to influence majorities.66  It is plausible, as a matter of theory, that in 
such policy domains the votes of panel minorities can be influenced in the direction of the 
majority for any of the suppressed dissent reasons (e.g., workload, consensus norms), while at 
the same time the majority is not dampened.  On this view, voting in policy domains 
characterized by intense and entrenched views is more likely to be majoritarian.   
In a study of gender and race panel effects in employment discrimination cases, Farhang 
and Wawro observed that if this majoritarian dynamic were operative, the sincere preferences of 
women and racial minority judges would only become visible (to researchers) when they are in 
the majority.  Farhang and Wawro wrote:        
If we find that the probability of an outcome in favor of a civil rights plaintiff does not 
increase when one minority serves on a panel but does increase when two serve, this 
would be evidence in favor of the suppressed dissent hypothesis. We would interpret this 
result as indicating that the more liberal votes of minority judges when they are in a 
majority better represent their sincere preferences, which are not influencing outcomes 
when only one serves on a panel.67  
III. Data, Models, and Analysis 
This project is part of a larger study of decision making by federal courts of appeals on 
issues of class certification. We examine both published and unpublished cases.  With respect to 
 
64  Kim, supra note 24, at 1330-31.. See also Kastellec, supra note 65, at 349 (2011). 
 
65 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 8-9. 
 
66 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 62-63, 69-70.  Using different methods and 
improved data, Professor Fischman finds that there are minority panel effects on majorities in 
capital punishment and abortion cases.  Joshua Fischman, Interpreting Circuit Court Voting 
Patterns: A Social Interactions Framework," 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 808 (2015).  Our point here 
is conceptual and not about Sunstein et al.’s specific empirical claims.      
 
67 Farhang & Wawro, supra note 7, at 310. 
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published (precedential) cases, we endeavored to build a comprehensive dataset of federal Court 
of Appeals panel decisions addressing whether a class should be certified from 1966, when the 
modern Rule 23 became effective, through 2017.68  With respect to unpublished 
(nonprecedential) cases, we collected the same data from 2002, by which time nearly all 
unpublished cases appeared in the Federal Appendix, through 2017.69  In total, we identified 
1350 certification decisions.    
   
Of course, published Court of Appeals decisions differ from unpublished decisions in 
important respects, and published decisions are not representative of all litigated cases.70  We can 
learn from both types of decisions.  We are interested, in part, in the influence of ideological and 
identity characteristics of judges, if any, on the creation and development of law.  Published 
Court of Appeals opinions are the vehicle through which circuits create and develop law that is 
binding on all subsequent panels and on all district courts in the circuit, while unpublished 
decisions have no precedential weight.  In initial models we will examine only published 
opinions. 
 
We are also interested in the full universe of decided certification appeals.  In addition to 
the possible unrepresentativeness of published cases with respect to judicial behavior, there may 
be other selection processes at play when analyzing only published opinions.  The same judges 
that render decisions in published cases also decide whether the case will be published, 
threatening to confound inferences about the relationship between judge characteristics and case 
outcomes when one studies only published cases.  Thus, we also examine models of published 
and unpublished cases restricted to the circuit-years in which we have complete data on both.  In 
those models, the results look very similar to what we observe when analyzing only published 
cases.   
 
Our dependent variable is whether a decision is pro or anti-certification.  In order to code 
it, the certification analysis in each decision was read in full.  We code a decision as pro-
certification (=1) if the Court of Appeals affirms the trial court’s certification, reverses the trial 
court’s decision not to certify and directs it to certify, or reverses the trial court’s decision not to 
 
68 See Appendix, Part I.A, for further details on data collection. 
 
69 See Appendix, Part I.A, for further details on data collection.  We say “nearly” all 
published decisions because the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ unpublished decisions did not 
consistently appear in the Federal Appendix until 2003 and 2005, respectively. See Andrew T. 
Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for Ethical Problems & Legal 
Malpractice?, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 205–06 (2007).  As discussed in Part I.A of the 
Appendix, our models that include unpublished opinions account for this.  
 
70 See David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum 
Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 843 (2005); Deborah Jones Merritt and James 
J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71 (2001); Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes 
Perceptions of the Federal Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1989).  
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certify and remands for further proceedings on certification.  We code a case as anti-certification 
(=0) if the Court of Appeals affirms the trial court’s decision not to certify, reverses the trial 
court’s decision to certify and directs that a class not be certified, or reverses the trial court’s 
decision to certify and remands for further proceedings on certification. 
 
The task of measuring how a judge or panel characteristic may influence lawmaking is 
difficult.  The most clearly observable manifestation of influence is an increase in the probability 
of a decision in favor of or against certification.  However, much bargaining and deliberation 
among judges focuses on how to frame or justify a decision once it has been determined which 
party will prevail.71  Such decisions about framing and justification can have important 
ramifications for the actual policy consequences of an opinion for future cases.  Although we 
believe that our dependent variable captures much that is important to the creation and 
development of the law governing certification under Rule 23, we readily acknowledge its limits, 
which we regard as one cost of a large-N empirical study, as compared to a qualitative study that 
examines not just outcomes but also the scope and implications of reasoning.   
 
This measurement constraint limits the inferences we can make from our data.  If we find 
that some judge or panel characteristic is not associated with either pro- or anti-certification 
voting, we cannot conclude that the judge or panel characteristic has no directional influence on 
opinion content.  On the other hand, as previously noted, flipping an outcome is probably the 
most extreme form of influence, and thus to the extent that we find that a judge or panel 
characteristic is associated with a decision on certification in a particular direction, that 
characteristic is likely influencing opinion content in the same direction in more subtle ways. 
 
For each case, we identified the party,72 gender, and race of each judge using the Federal 
Judicial Center Biographical database.73  With respect to race, our models focus on whether 
African American judges have different voting behavior than white and other judges, with other 
being Hispanic, Asian American, and Native American.  Numerous past studies finding that race 
is associated with Court of Appeals judges’ voting have focused, in whole or in part, on African 
American judges as a discrete category.74  We also examined alternative specifications of all 
models presented in this article (not displayed) pooling all non-white judges into a single racial 
minority category, and comparing them to white judges.  In those models, we found no 
 
71 See EPSTEIN AND KNIGHT, supra note 61. 
 
72 Again, we use party of the appointing president as a proxy for judges’ ideological 
preferences. 
 
73 https://www.fjc.gov/search/site/biographical%20database 
 
74 See Cox and Miles, supra note 7; Kastellec, supra note 7; HAIRE AND MOYER, supra 
note 2, at 28-32; Jonathan P. Kastellec, Race, Context and Judging on the Courts of Appeals: 
Race-Based Panel Effects in Death Penalty Cases (July 26, 2016),  available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2594946 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2594946 
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statistically significant differences at either the individual or the panel level.75  The race 
differences we report are distinctive to African American judges.   
 
The inferences we draw from the party, gender, and race variables are based on the 
assumption that case assignment to panels is random, or “as-if” random, regarding the 
relationship between panel composition and the merits of the motion for class certification.76  
We incorporate a battery of control variables that include a variety of case characteristics, which 
are detailed in Part I.B of the Appendix.  The models also contain circuit fixed effects and year 
fixed effects. 
 
Circuit fixed effects account for any variables that change across circuits that would take 
the same value for each judge on a panel within that circuit, such as circuit doctrine that may 
have a pro- or anti-certification slant, and variation in the size and content of caseloads across 
circuits.  Year fixed effects account for any variables that change over time that would take the 
same value for each judge on a panel within that year, such as national trends in caseload, the 
evolution of Supreme Court doctrine, changing composition of the Supreme Court, changes in 
Rule 23, and salient features of the partisan or political environment, such as an anti-litigation 
posture in a party agenda.  They also account for trends over time in attitudes among male and 
white judges toward female and African American co-panelists, which may affect the extent to 
which the latter are influenced by the former.  The circuit and year fixed effects approach 
leverages only variation in the relationship between judges’ identity characteristics and their 
 
75 We also find that Hispanic judges’ votes and the presence of a Hispanic judge on a 
panel are not associated with higher probabilities of pro-certification votes and outcomes.  
Among our cases with published opinions, we have an insufficient number of panels (12 cases) 
with a majority of Hispanic judges to evaluate their preferences when in the majority.  As we 
discuss below, it is not possible to evaluate with confidence whether minority group judges have 
distinctive preferences in some issue domains based only on their individual votes and their votes 
when in a panel minority.  There are an insufficient number of cases in the data with Asian 
American judges to evaluate them separately.       
   
76 By “as-if” random we mean that departures from true random assignment of cases are 
inconsequential with respect to anything that would affect the outcomes studied.  Levy and 
Chilton report the results of an empirical study finding small differences in the frequency with 
which circuits constituted panels with particular partisan configurations, such as panels with one 
Republican, or panels with two Democrats, relative to a scenario in which all panels were 
constituted purely by random draws from the circuit’s slate of eligible judges.  They suggest that 
such departures from randomness may arise from considerations of workload or judges’ 
scheduling needs.  See Marin Levy and Adam Chilton, Challenging the Randomness of Panel 
Assignment in the Federal Appellate Courts, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2015).  The validity of 
inferences from our judge characteristic variables do not depend on the assumption of random 
assignment of judges to panels, but rather on the assumption of random assignment of cases to 
panels once they are constituted.  That is, we require the assumption that, for example, panels 
with two women, or panels with three Democrats, are not more likely to be assigned cases with 
stronger bases to grant certification.  See Deborah Beim, Tom S. Clark, and Benjamin E. 
Lauderdale, Random Assignment to Death, 4 (1/20/19) (on file with authors). 
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votes within circuit and year.  This approach allows us to estimate the effects of identity 
characteristics most effectively because it controls for the influence of any variables that would 
take the same value for each judge in the same circuit, and each judge in the same year.     
 
A. A Descriptive Look at the Data   
 
We first present the data descriptively and then turn to statistical models.  We recognize 
that there may be interesting variation over time in certification voting behavior and outcomes.  
However, our focus in this article is on the relationship between judge characteristics and 
certification votes and outcomes. Other than sub-setting the data at its approximate midpoint, we 
treat the data cross-sectionally and do not examine longitudinal variation.  In another article 
growing out of the larger study, variation in certification over time will be a central focus.  
 
Table 1 shows the policy areas of the causes of action underlying the certification 
decisions in our data for all policy areas that exceed two percent of the data for each subset 
displayed.  We show descriptive statistics separately for discrete periods and data sources that 
are used in the models discussed later.   
   
Table 1: Policy Areas of Causes of Action Underlying Certification Decisions 
 
      1967-1994 1995-2017 2002-2017 
      Published Published Published & Unpublished 
 
Antitrust    6%  5%  6% 
Civil Rights, Anti-discrimination  39%  13%  10% 
Civil Rights, Prisoner   7%  3%  7%  
Civil Rights, Other   8%  6%  4%  
Consumer     5%  23%  25% 
Environmental    ___  3%  2% 
Insurance    ___  4%  6% 
Labor and Employment   5%  15%  17%   
Product liability    ___  6%  5% 
Public benefits    8%  ___  ___ 
Securities    11%  9%  8%   
Other     11%  13%  10% 
 
  Table 2 provides the percentage of pro-certification votes by party, gender, and race.  
The certification rate in published cases was similar in 1967-1994 (43%) and 1995-2017 (41%), 
but the gap between groups grew in the second period.  The difference between Republican and 
Democratic voting about doubled, increasing from 8 to 17 percentage points.  African American 
and white/other judges went from parity in the earlier period to African Americans certifying at a 
higher rate by 15 percentage points in the latter.  Women went from certifying at a lower rate 
than men by 6 percentage points to certifying at a higher rate by 11 percentage points.  When 
unpublished cases are added for the period 2002-2017, about one-third of the cases are 
unpublished.  The certification rates decline for all judge types (denials are more prevalent in 
unpublished dispositions).  In these cases, the party and gender gaps remain comparable to 
published cases in 1995-2017, whereas the race gap narrows.  The dissent rate in the data is quite 
low, at only 2 percent.  Although it increased over time, it never reaches 3 percent in any 
segment of the data.  
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  Table 2: Individual-Level Certification Percentages 
 
      1967-1994 1995-2017 2002-2017 
      Published Published Published & Unpublished 
 
All Votes  43%  41%  37%    
   
Republicans  39%  34%   30%  
  Democrats  47%  51%   44% 
 
   Males   44%  38%   34% 
   Females   38%  49%  43% 
 
   White/Other  43%  40%   36% 
   African American 43%  54%   43%    
 
 
 
Table 3: Panel Level Certification Percentages 
 
      1967-1994 1995-2017 2002-2017 
      Published Published Published & Unpublished 
 
“___” indicates fewer than ten cases.   
 
All Cases   43%   41%  36% 
      
Party 
 
All Republican   32%  27%  28% 
 1 Dem, 2 Rep   41%  37%  28% 
 2 Dem, 1 Rep   48%  51%  45% 
  All Democrat   49%  63%  58% 
 
Gender 
 
All Male   44%  34%  30% 
  1 Female, 2 Male   38%  44%  37% 
  2 Female, 1 Male  ___  59%  51% 
  All Female   ___  ___  ___ 
 
Race 
 
  All White/Other   44%  38%  35% 
  1 Af American 2 White/Other 42%  52%  42% 
  2 Af American, 1 White/Other ___  ___  43% 
  All African American  ___  ___  ___ 
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One simple way to characterize the data from a panel perspective is to examine the 
percentage of certification outcomes (not votes) on panels that have zero, one, two, and three 
panel members with the characteristic in question.  Table 3 displays this information.  We lack 
sufficient data on panels with three women, or with two or three African Americans, to 
meaningfully characterize them.  At the panel level, the relationships are more pronounced than 
at the individual level.  The swing from all-Republican to all-Democratic panels was 17 
percentage points in published cases in 1967-94; it jumped to 36 percentage points in published 
cases in 1995-2017; and it was 30 percentage points in all cases in 2002-17.   
 
We observe small differences between male and female judges, and between African 
American and white judges, in published cases in 1967-94 (the female and African American 
judges are nearly always in the panel minority).  In published cases in 1995-2017, more clear 
differences emerge.  The move from an all-male panel to one with a single female is associated 
with a 10 percentage-point increase in certification, and the addition of a second female is 
associated with another 15 percentage-point increase, for a total of 25.   These differences 
decline modestly but remain large in all cases in 2002-17, growing by 7 percentage points with 
the addition of one female judge, and an additional 14 percentage points with the addition of a 
second, for a total increase of 21.  In published cases in 1995-2017, the addition of one African 
American relative to an all-white/other panel is associated with an increase of 14 percentage 
points in the rate of certification, which declines to a difference of 7 percentage points in all 
cases in 2002-17.   
 
  In order to put the degree of ideological voting behavior in Court of Appeals decisions 
on class certification in perspective, it is informative to view it in light of the degree of such 
behavior in other areas.  The largest empirical study of Court of Appeals decision making in 
published cases is that of Sunstein et al.,77 which evaluated voting patterns across the 23 policy 
areas that are listed in Table 4.78  In selecting these 23 policy areas for study, Sunstein et al. 
specifically endeavored to study the “most controversial issues of the day,”79 not a random 
sample of the work of the Court of Appeals.  
 
Using these data as a benchmark for Court of Appeals lawmaking in especially 
controversial areas, class certification is a little above the median in terms of ideological voting 
and outcomes.80  The 14 percentage-point difference between individual-level Democratic and 
 
77 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10. 
 
78 Table 4 reflects differences between individual votes of Democratic and Republican 
appointees across all cases (D-R) and differences between Democratic and Republican votes on 
all-Democratic panels versus all-Republican panels (DDD-RRR), which is an approximate 
measure of differences in case outcomes on such panels. This is because dissent rates on unified 
panels are exceedingly low.  In our certification data, over 98 percent of unified panels are 
unanimous.   
 
79 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 8. 
 
80 Comparing our data to the Sunstein et al. data is not straightforward because in 
different policy areas they collected data over different periods, and they were not consistent 
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Republican votes in our class certification data is a little above the median for the policy areas 
listed in Table 4, which is 10 percentage points.  The 31 percentage-point difference in votes on 
all-Democratic versus all-Republican panels in class certification cases is a little above the 
median for the policy areas listed in Table 4, which is 28.  We suspect that many will be 
surprised that the outcome changes associated with moving from unified Democratic to 
Republican panels in certification decisions is larger than, for example, such changes in 
obscenity, capital punishment, employment discrimination, desegregation, and abortion cases.81  
 
Table 4: Sunstein et al. Data on Differences Between Percent of Liberal Votes and Outcomes by Democratic 
Versus Republican Appointees 
      D%-R%*   DDD%-RRR%** 
      Individual-level   Panel-level  
Gay and Lesbian Rights    40    86 
National Environmental Policy Act   24    51 
NLRB       20    50 
Affirmative Action    28    49 
Sex Discrimination    17    46 
11th Amendment Abrogation    21    43 
Piercing the Corporate Veil   13    39 
Contract Clause     7    33 
EPA      10    33 
ADA      16    33 
Class Certification    14    31 
Campaign Finance    17    31 
Obscenity      9    25 
Federal Communications Commission  8    25 
Capital Punishment    24    20 
Title VII     9    17 
Desegregation     9    15 
Standing     5    13 
Abortion     16    11 
First Amendment     6    7 
Criminal Appeals     4    2 
Federalism     3    1 
Takings      4    -2 
Punitive Damages    0    -10 
*The % of liberal votes in the policy area by Democratic appointees, minus the % by Republicans appointees 
**The % of liberal outcomes in the policy area by all-Democratic panels, minus the % by all-Republican panels  
  
 
regarding whether unpublished cases were included.  The most common starting decade in the 
Sunstein data was the 1990s.  SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 157-63.  We conclude that the 
most reasonable basis for comparison is the combination of our 1995-2017 published cases and 
our 2002-17 unpublished cases.        
 
81 We show below in statistical models that the actual difference between all-Democratic 
and all-Republican panels is significantly larger when one conditions on necessary controls.  We 
limit our comparison to descriptive statistics because Sunstein et al. do not use statistical models 
of the sort that we do.   
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B. Statistical Models  
 
Of course, bivariate descriptive statistics can be misleading, especially when they pool 
cases over a half century and across every circuit.  A statistical model is required to get a 
stronger handle on the data.  In the empirical models of published cases that we discuss below, 
we first present a model pooled over the full period 1967-2017 and then present models 
separately for the periods 1967-1994 and 1995-2017.  Dividing the data roughly in half allows us 
to observe whether the significance or magnitudes of results changed materially over time.  In 
addition, the breakpoint we select is substantively significant.  As documented in our prior work, 
beginning around the mid-1990s, restricting opportunities and incentives for private civil actions 
in general—and class actions in particular—became a more salient issue in the Republican Party.  
Congressional Republicans introduced a growing number of anti-class action bills; important 
advocacy groups associated with the Republican Party, specifically including business groups 
and conservative law reform organizations, elevated their focus on curtailing class actions, and 
Supreme Court justices became more polarized along ideological lines in their voting on Rule 23 
issues.82         
 
1. Individual-Level Model of Judge Votes 
 
We begin with naive models (in that they ignore panel composition) that include judge-
level variables measuring party, gender, and race, as well as the set of independent variables 
described in Part I.B of the Appendix.  These logit models, with certification votes as the 
dependent variable, are reported in Table A-1 (Part I.C of the Appendix).  Coefficients in logit 
models cannot be directly interpreted, and thus it is necessary to compute predicted changes in 
probability of certification associated with a change in categories of independent variables (such 
as the change from Republican to Democrat).   
 
In published cases over the full period (Model A), party is significant and positive with a 
magnitude similar to the simple percentage differences in raw voting rates.  Party is associated 
with an increase of 10 percentage points in the probability of a vote for certification.  The 
separate models for 1967-94 (Model B) and 1995-2017 (Model C) show that panel ideology 
grew from a 7 percentage point difference in the first period to a 12 percentage point difference 
in the second.  In the 2002-17 model of all cases (Model D), the difference was 10 percentage 
points.  Gender and race are insignificant in all four models, although race approaches 
significance in the 1995-2017 model of published cases, and gender does so in the 2002-17 
model of all cases.  Viewed at the individual judge level, gender and race appear to be unrelated, 
or only marginally related, to judges’ votes on certification.   
 
We considered the possibility of interaction effects among party, gender, and race.  This 
allows evaluation, for example, of whether female Democrats, or African American women, are 
associated with a distinctive probability of certification that is not captured by the direct effects 
 
82 See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution 
against Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1524-28 (2017). 
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of party and gender, or race and gender, respectively.  We take this up in Part III of the Appendix 
and do not find evidence for such interaction effects.  
 
2. Panel-Level Model of Outcomes 
 
The data are much more interesting at the panel level.  In our panel-level outcome model, 
the unit of analysis is the case.  In each case, we measure panel effects with dichotomous 
variables (taking the value of 0 or 1) indicating whether the panel contained zero, one, two, or 
three Democrats; zero, one, two, or three women; and zero, one, two, or three African 
Americans.  All-Republican panels, all-male panels, and all-white/other panels are the reference 
categories for the party, gender, and race panel variables.  This allows us to evaluate, for 
example, whether panels with one, two, or three Democrats have a statistically distinguishable 
probability of certification from an all-Republican panel (the reference category), and if so, by 
what margin.  The logistic regression models of certification outcomes reported in Table A-2 (in 
Part I.C of the Appendix) contain the full set of these party, gender, and race panel variables, and 
all of the control variables enumerated in Part I.B of the Appendix.    
 
a. Party 
 
Model A shows that panels with one, two, and three Democrats are all statistically 
significantly more likely to vote in a pro-certification direction than all-Republican panels in 
published cases over the full period.  Table 5 displays predicted probabilities, derived from the 
model, of pro-certification outcomes for each of the four partisan (ideological) panel 
combinations.  All-Republican panels have a 26% estimated probability of a pro-certification 
outcome.  The probability grows to 48% for RRD panels, to 55% for RDD panels, to 61% for 
all-Democrat panels.   
 
The separate models for published cases in 1967-94 (Model B) and 1995-2017 (Model C) 
show that panel ideology is potent in both periods but materially larger in the latter.  In the 1967-
94 period, the move from an all-Republican to an all-Democratic panel is associated with a 26 
percentage-point increase in the probability of certification, from 31 to 57%.  In the 1995-2017 
period, it is associated with a 40 percentage-point increase, from 24 to 64%.  Further, while RRD 
panels approach being statistically distinguishable from RRR panels in the earlier period, in the 
latter period they are clearly not.  This means that one Democrat is not panel affecting, or 
dampening, two Republicans.  A supplemental regression shows that one Republican also does 
not panel affect two Democrats in published cases in 1995-2017.83  Thus, as the ideological 
distance between DDD panels and RRR panels grew in the contemporary period, the partisan 
panel dynamics became more majoritarian, with partisan minorities clearly failing to influence 
partisan majorities (no dampening) as measured by outcome in precedential cases.   
 
 
83 In order to arrive at this conclusion, we reran the same model, but this time we held out 
as the reference category panels with three Democratic judges.  The coefficient for a DDR panel 
is clearly insignificant, showing that one Republican does not panel affect two Democrats.     
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Model D includes both published and unpublished cases from the period 2002-2017, and 
we find that the addition of unpublished cases changes little.  Although the certification rate 
declines marginally for all panel types—indicating that unpublished dispositions have a lower 
certification rate on average -- the results for party differences look very similar to those in the 
1995-2017 model of published cases.  The gap between all-Republican and all-Democratic 
panels is 38 percentage points (as compared to 40 in published cases in 1995-2017).  Partisan 
minorities do not panel effect partisan majorities.         
          
Table 5: Predicted Probabilities of Pro-Certification Outcomes  
for Party, Gender, and Race-Panel Combinations 
 
 Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D   Model E  Model F 
 1967-2017 1967-94  1995-2017 2002-17  2002-17  2002-17 
 Published  Published  Published All Cases       All Cases  All Cases   
         No Discrim           No Civ Rts 
 
“___” indicates that panel type is not statistically distinguishable from the reference category (in italics).   
** Indicates no cases in model. 
      PARTY 
 
3 Reps   26%  31%  24%  20%  21%  17%  
 
1 Dem, 2 Rep 48%  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  
   
2 Rep, 1 Rep 55%  56%  52%  47%  47%  50%  
   
3 Dem   61%  57%  64%  58%  58%  67% 
   
      GENDER 
 
3 Males  37%  41%  32%  28%  28%  30%  
 
1 Fem, 2 Male ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___ 
    
2 Fem, 1 Male  58%  ___  57%   49%  50%  49% 
   
3 Fem  **  **  **  ___  ___  ___ 
          
      RACE 
 
3 White/Other  41%  43%  38%  34%  35%  35% 
 
1 Af Am, 2 W/O 50%  ___  54%  47%  48%  49% 
   
2 Af Am, 1 W/O ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___ 
   
3 Af Am **  **  **  **  **  ** 
 
Note: In models with three females or two African Americans designated as statistically indistinguishable from all 
male and all white/other panels, the maximum number of cases present is 4 and 14, respectively, and thus we lack 
sufficient data to offer meaningful estimates.   
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b. Gender 
 
Controlling for the partisan and racial composition of the panel, and the variables listed in 
Part I.B of the Appendix, panels with one woman do not have a statistically distinguishable 
probability of a pro-certification outcome when compared to all-male panels in any model.  
Although we have a large number of panels with one female judge—276 panels, or 45% of the 
cases, in the 2002-17 model of all cases—the coefficient on the variable is small and it never 
approaches significance.  In contrast, for panels with two women it is highly significant, and the 
difference is large.  In published cases over the full period (Model A), moving from an all-male 
panel to one with two female judges is associated with a 21% increase in the probability of 
certification, growing from 37% to 58%.     
 
The separate models for published cases 1967-94 (Model B) and 1995-2017 (Model C) 
show that the result for two-female panels is driven entirely by the latter period.  This is no 
surprise because panels with two female judges were virtually nonexistent prior to 1995, with 
only two occurring in the data.  When analysis is restricted to the latter period, the difference 
between two-female panels and all-male ones is a little larger, associated with an increase of 25 
percentage points, from 32 to 57% probability of certification.       
 
In our model of both published and unpublished cases decided in 2002-2017 (Model D) 
we again find that the addition of unpublished cases changes little.  Panels with two female 
judges are associated with a 21 percentage point growth in the probability of certification, which 
is about the same as in the 1995-2017 model of published cases.  In our data for the 2002-17 
period, there are 104 panels with two women.  Sixty-five different women appear on those 
panels, which are spread over ten circuits.    
 
This raises the question whether women in the panel minority, when not affecting the 
outcome votes of their male colleagues, are more likely to dissent.  Or are women in the panel 
minority joining the majority opinion nevertheless and suppressing their dissents?  As compared 
to a male serving on an all-male panel, women are not more likely to dissent when serving with 
two men, nor are men when serving with two women.  The gender composition of the panel is 
not in any respect associated with dissenting behavior.84   
 
We considered the possibility that male judges’ probability of a pro-certification vote is 
unaffected by the presence of one female colleague because women are, on average, less senior.  
That is, it is possible that judges are more likely to defer to more senior panel colleagues, and 
women are on average less senior, such that the lack of women’s influence on outcomes when 
they are in a minority may be a function of their relative lack of seniority rather than their 
gender.  We evaluated whether increasing levels of seniority among women serving on panels 
with two men is associated with certification outcomes and found the relationship to be clearly 
statistically insignificant.  Women’s lack of influence on outcomes when they are in a minority is 
not associated with their level of seniority.   
 
 
84 See Appendix, Part II.   
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We also considered the possibility that women from a particular political party (like 
female Democrats) are associated with a distinctive probability of certification that is not 
captured by the direct effects of party and gender.  We take this up in Part III of the Appendix 
and find no evidence that it is the case.  
 
Our interpretation of the higher rate of pro-certification voting by women when they form 
a panel majority is that it more accurately reflects female judges’ sincere preferences.  When 
female judges are in the minority, outcomes on male-majority panels are unaffected by these 
preferences, and from this we conclude that none of the “modified content” hypotheses is 
operative on such panels as measured by outcome.  Neither deliberation, nor bargaining, nor cue 
taking is allowing women in the panel minority to affect certification outcomes in the direction 
of the preferences revealed when they are in the majority.85  
 
This result stands in marked contrast to past work finding gender or race panel effects on 
the Courts of Appeals.86  In each of these studies, where there was clear evidence of gender or 
race-based variation in preferences, the presence of one woman or African American in the panel 
minority was associated with the voting of men and whites in the majority.  All of these results 
occurred in the disposition of substantive law claims concerning discrimination and inequality.87 
A different and more majoritarian gender dynamic is at work in our class-certification decisions.      
 
An important caveat is necessary regarding what can be inferred from the data.  The data 
show that one woman’s presence on a panel does not increase the probability of certification 
relative to all-male panels.  Because we lack a sufficient number of all-female panels (there are 
 
 
85 As a theoretical matter we would not expect cue taking to be operative in certification 
decisions, at least outside the context of “gender-coded issues.” Peresie, supra note 7, at 1783. 
 
86 See Farhang and Wawro, supra note 7; Peresie, supra note 7; Cox and Miles, supra 
note 7; Boyd, Epstein, and Martin, supra note 3; Kastellec, supra note 7.  Indeed, inquiring 
whether a deliberation account fully captured the panel effects she found, when Peresie 
“included a dummy variable in the regressions for the presence of a second female judge, … that 
variable had no statistically significant effect on male judges’ [votes].” Peresie, supra note 7, at 
1782. Farhang and Wawro similarly found that “having a majority of women on the panel does 
not increase the probability that either male or female judges on the panel will vote for the 
plaintiff over the increase that occurs when there is one woman serving on the panel.” Farhang 
and Wawro, supra note 7, at 320. See id. at 321 (no effect on outcome). 
 
87 HAIRE AND MOYER, supra note 2, at 96-97, when analyzing a large sample of cases 
pooled across many policy areas, find that the presence of two “nontraditional” judges (female or 
nonwhite) is associated with greater variance, or unpredictability, in white male judges’ votes.  
Ultimately, it is not possible to derive any inference from Haire and Moyer’s variance results 
regarding the ideological direction of white male judges’ votes (or nontraditional judge votes) in 
panels composed of one white male and two nontraditional judges, and thus those results do not 
speak to the substance of our analysis.   
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only four in the data), the data cannot rule out the possibility that one male similarly fails to 
influence the probability of certification relative to all-female panels.  Because we lack the 
benchmark of how all-female panels would vote, we cannot observe whether one male panel-
affects two females relative to all-female panels.  Thus, we do not know whether the structure of 
gender panel dynamics is symmetric or asymmetric. 
 
Fifteen percent of the judge votes in the data are cast by women, and there is at least one 
woman on 29 percent of the three-judge panels, but women are in the majority in only 8 percent 
of the panels.  Men are 87% of the votes and in the majority 92% of the time.  As distinguished 
from the earlier studies finding gender panel effects, where women in the minority influenced 
outcomes, the majoritarian character of gender panel dynamics in certification decisions yields 
circuit lawmaking that significantly underrepresents female judges’ preferences (and 
overrepresents male judge’s preferences) relative to their numbers on the Courts of Appeals.  
 
c. Race 
 
Controlling for the partisan and gender composition of the panel and the variables listed 
in Part I.B of the Appendix, panels with one African American have a statistically significantly 
higher probability of a pro-certification outcome than all-white/other panels in published cases 
over the full period (Table A-1, Model A).  All white/other panels have a predicted probability of 
41% to produce a pro-certification outcome, and for panels with one African American the 
probability is 50% (Table 5), for a 9 percentage-point growth.  In contrast, panels with two 
African American judges are not statistically distinguishable from all white/other panels.  
However, with only 11 such panels in this model we do not regard this estimate as meaningful.  
 
 The separate models for published cases in 1967-94 (Model B) and 1995-2017 (Model 
C) show that the result for one-African American panels is primarily driven by the latter period.  
Of 166 one-African American panels, 72 are in the first period, and 94 in the latter.  In the first 
period the variable is insignificant, and in the second period the coefficient doubles and becomes 
significant.  In the 1995-2017 model the presence of one-African American judge is associated 
with an increase of 16 percentage points, from 38 to 54% probability of certification (Table 5).   
 
In the model of both published and unpublished cases decided in 2002-2017 (Model D) 
we again observe little change relative to the model of published cases decided in 1995-2017.  
The presence of one African American judge remains significant and is associated with a 13 
percentage-point increase in the probability of certification, from 34 to 47%.  In our data for 
2002-17, there are 130 panels with one African American.  Thirty-three African American 
judges appear in those panels, which are spread over every circuit. 
  
We considered the possibility that African Americans from a particular political party 
(like African American Democrats) are associated with a distinctive probability of certification 
that is not captured by the direct effects of party and race.  We take this up in Part III of the 
Appendix and find no evidence that it is the case.88  Likewise, we considered whether judges 
 
88 See Appendix, Part III.  When we say that the association is not driven by African 
American judges from a particular political party, we mean only that the two types of panels are 
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with the intersectional identity of African American women (or men) are associated with more 
(or less) pro-certification voting than is captured by the separate direct effects of the race and 
gender variables, and we again find no evidence that it is the case, although the small number of 
African American women in the data limit our ability to detect small differences.89 
 
3. Panel-Level Model of Judge Votes (as distinguished from Case Outcomes) 
 
We also examined models of individual judge votes, where the key independent variables 
capture both the salient characteristic of the voting judge and those of her colleagues on the 
panel.  This allows us to compare, for example, the votes of a male judge sitting with two males, 
and the votes of a male judge sitting with one male and one female.  Part II of the Appendix 
explains in detail how these variables were constructed.  We then examined vote-level versions 
of the case-level logit models we have just discussed, including the same control variables.  The 
models are presented and discussed in Part II of the Appendix.  Given the very high rate of 
unanimity in our cases (98%), it is not surprising that the vote-level models tell the same panel 
effects story as the outcome-level models with respect to party, gender, and race panel effects.   
 
4. Discrimination and Other Civil Rights Claims versus Other Underlying 
Causes of Action   
 
Another distinctive feature of our results concerns the existence of variation in judges’ 
preferences along gender and race lines in the area of class certification.  As we have noted, past 
findings of variation in Court of Appeals judges’ voting along gender and racial lines have 
clustered heavily in areas relating to discrimination and inequality, and variation has often been 
absent even in those areas.90  Boyd, Epstein, and Martin’s study of thirteen policy areas finds 
gender associated with differences in voting in only one (gender-based employment 
discrimination), and they find no differences in a number of areas with comparable or high 
gender salience (abortion, sexual harassment, and affirmative action).91  Haire and Moyer find 
that, in a large sample of cases spanning many policy areas that have a liberal/conservative 
dimension, African American judges do not vote more liberally than white judges on the Courts 
 
not statistically distinguishable from one another.  In another sense, it is clearly Democratic 
African Americans that are driving the result.  Because Democratic presidents have appointed 
African Americans at a dramatically higher rate, in 87 percent of our cases with one African 
American, the African American was appointed by a Democrat.  We were unable to examine 
specifications comparing different partisan combinations on panels with two African Americans 
(as we do for gender) because there are an insufficient number of such panels.  
 
89 See Appendix, Part III. 
 
90 See Farhang and Wawro, supra note 7; Peresie, supra note 7; Boyd, Epstein, and 
Martin, supra note 3; HAIRE AND MOYER, supra note 2. 
 
91 See Boyd, Epstein, and Martin, supra note 3, at 400–06. 
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of Appeals.  However, in employment discrimination cases based on race, they have a higher 
probability of voting in the pro-plaintiff direction.92 
 
We considered the possibility that the gender and race results we report as to class 
certification are being driven by cases with underlying discrimination claims, and thus that they 
do not represent much of a departure from existing work on gender, race and judging.  That is, 
past work has shown that female and African American Court of Appeals judges are more likely 
to favor plaintiffs making at least some types of discrimination claims, and from there it is a 
short step to favoring discrimination plaintiffs seeking class certification.  When all types of 
discrimination claims are combined, they constitute 10 percent of the data for our 2002-17 
models of published and unpublished cases, so that their influence on the results may be 
important.  We excluded those cases and reran the model.   
 
The same gender and race panel variables remain significant and of comparable 
magnitude when we drop discrimination claims.93  The differences in predicted probabilities 
between all-male panels and panels with two women, and between all-white/other panels and 
panels with one African American, are virtually identical.94  We then additionally exclude cases 
coded prisoners’ rights, and other civil rights (which together constitute another 11 percent of the 
data) so that there are no civil rights claims of any kind remaining in the data.  In this model, the 
differences in predicted probabilities across the same panel types again remain significant and of 
similar magnitude, with two-female panels associated with a 19 percentage point increase in the 
probability of certification, and one-African American panels associated with a 14 percentage 
point increase.95   
 
We conclude with confidence that the results are not driven by discrimination claims or 
civil rights claims more broadly.  When all civil-rights claims (discrimination or other) are 
excluded from the data for the 2002-17 period, the policy areas constituting 2 percent or more of 
the underlying claims are, in descending order of share: consumer, labor and employment 
(primarily wage and hour and ERISA), securities, insurance, antitrust, product liability, and 
environmental and toxic substances.  Even outside the domain of anti-discrimination law and 
civil-rights law more broadly, female majority panels, and panels with one African American, 
have a higher propensity to certify classes.  This result departs sharply from conventional 
wisdom and existing research.96    
 
92 See HAIRE AND MOYER, supra note 2, 30-32 (compare Model 1 and Model 4 in Table 
1). 
 
93 The results are presented in Model E in Table A-1 (in Part I.C of the Appendix).   
94 See Table 5.   
  
95 See Table 5, and Appendix, Part I, Table A-1, Model F.   
   
96 It is likewise the case that when we exclude all discrimination and other civil rights 
claims from the 1995-2017 model of published cases, the gender and race panel results are 
robust.   
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C. Explaining Pro-certification Preferences and Gender Panel Effects 
 
1. Pro-certification Preferences 
 
It is unclear why female and African American judges have more pro-certification 
preferences.  The explanation that connects most readily to existing literature is that these 
preferences are tied to findings showing that female and African American judges are more 
attentive to claims of discrimination and inequality.97  The fact that our gender and race results 
are robust when such claims are excluded does not foreclose the validity of this line of reasoning.  
It is beyond question that the class action device has been an enormously valuable tool in the 
struggle for gender and racial equality.  In light of the trans-substantive nature of Rule 23, 
interpretations of the rule in the domains of consumer, securities, and wage and hour law, for 
example, can shape future applications in domains such as employment, housing, and voting 
discrimination.  Strategic judges concerned with developing the device for use in the latter areas 
may be motivated to render more pro-certification decisions in the former areas.  If this is true, 
the trans-substantive character of the rule causes pro-certification preferences in the domain of 
discrimination and inequality to have pro-certification spillover effects in all other domains to 
which the rule applies. 
 
To be sure, this is speculative.  The fact that the results are robust to dropping 
discrimination and other civil rights claims may also mean that female and African American 
judges simply have more pro-certification preferences in general.  One variant of this account is 
only a short step from the explanation in the last paragraph minus the strategic dimension.  If 
female and African American judges are more pro-plaintiff in cases raising some types of claims 
based on discrimination and inequality, and they perceive that the class action device has been an 
enormously valuable tool in the struggle for gender, racial, and other forms of equality, then it 
may be that female and African American judges  have a more favorable view of the class device 
as a vehicle to provide remedies and achieve regulatory goals more generally.     
  
Whatever the reason, our gender results counsel caution in interpreting past studies as 
having demonstrated that female judges do not have different preferences than male judges on 
the Courts of Appeals with the exception of certain discrimination claims.  An important study 
cited for this conclusion was conducted by Boyd, Epstein, and Martin,98 which finds that in 12 
out of 13 policy areas, women did not vote differently.  The single exception was gender-based 
employment discrimination claims.  However, they acknowledge that in each area they studied 
their sample sizes were too small to evaluate panels with two women.99  The study thus was 
unable to evaluate the possibility that a combination of majoritarian voting dynamics and 
 
 
97 See notes 23-29. 
 
98 See Boyd, Epstein, and Martin, supra note 3. 
 
99 Id. at 392–93, nn.8 & 11. 
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pressure toward suppressed dissent, or some other mechanism, could be such that in some policy 
domains women’s different preferences will only become visible in female-majority panels.  
That is what we observe in our class certification data.   
 
It is only because of our unusually large dataset relative to norms in the field, and the 
heavy concentration of our cases in the last two decades—during which time there was a 
substantially larger number of panels with two women—that we had a sufficient number to 
detect that women’s preferences are more pro-certification when in the majority.  This limitation 
in existing scholarship on the influence of judge gender on the Courts of Appeals is an important 
contextual consideration for interpreting every study that we are aware of reporting null results 
for gender, none of which examines panels with two women.100     
 
2.    Gender Panel Effects 
 
Our data do not allow us to identify the panel dynamics that explain why the presence of 
one female on a panel is not associated with higher rates of pro-certification outcomes but the 
presence of two women is.  Nevertheless, we recognize some possible explanations.  One is 
straightforward.  The single female judge, on average, advocates a more pro-certification view, 
but this advocacy does not affect the outcome votes of the male majority because they have 
intense preferences in the domain of class certification and do not concede on outcomes.  
Sunstein et al., who studied partisan panel effects but not race and gender, argue that panel 
effects are less likely to occur in policy domains, such as abortion and capital punishment, in 
which judges have intense and “entrenched” preferences, undercutting the ability of partisan 
panel minorities to influence majorities.101 
As we have already noted, we lack sufficient data on all-female panels to draw any 
inferences regarding whether one male is affecting the votes of his two female co-panelists 
relative to the benchmark of panels comprised of only women.  Thus, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that judges in the gender majority—in general, whether male or female—do not give 
ground on outcomes in this policy domain.  This explanation for the absence of a one-female 
panel effect would be analogous to what is probably the most likely explanation for the absence 
of a one-Democrat or one-Republican panel effect in the 1995-2017 period (which is when the 
 
100 See Cox and Miles, supra note 7 (reporting that gender is not associated with Court of 
Appeals judges’ likelihood of voting in favor of liability in voting rights cases based on 
individual-level results); Kastellec, supra note 7 (same with respect to voting in favor of 
affirmative action programs on the U.S. Courts of Appeals); Sisk et al., supra note 24 (same with 
respect to voting in favor of plaintiffs alleging religious discrimination on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals); Songer, Davis, and Haire, supra note 25 (same with respect to search and seizure and 
obscenity cases on the U.S. Courts of Appeals).  None of these studies examined female-majority 
panels.  In some of these studies, the authors clearly lacked a sufficient sample size to do so, and 
in some they were primarily interested in studying race, but all report gender to be insignificantly 
associated with the outcome variables studied. 
 
101 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 62-63, 69-70. 
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two-female panel effect is present).  On this account, judges simply care intensely about 
certification and have entrenched views, and thus majoritarian dynamics prevail.       
  
Our results for panels with one African American counsel caution in embracing—and 
arguably militate against—this interpretation.  At the same time that one female judge is not 
panel affecting her two co-panelists, one African American judge is doing so strongly.  We 
therefore know that Court of Appeals judges’ votes on certification are, in fact, not impervious to 
significant influence by one judge from another group.  The puzzle is why this occurs with 
respect to race but not gender.    
 
 Recent innovative work in political science has focused on the gender gap in political 
discussions and decision making (and critical mass theory applied to this context).102 This work 
leverages an insight drawn from the existing literature that numbers alone (descriptive 
representation) do not guarantee women substantive representation. It uses institutional theory to 
identify structural arrangements and norms that may affect the ability of women to exercise 
“authoritative representation,” which is “any feature of communication among decision-makers 
that affects their authority,” or their “expectation of influence,” during the decision-making 
process.103 Scholars have tested hypotheses drawn from this merger of gender and institutional 
theory by analyzing behavior in a variety of discussion and decision-making contexts, involving 
both elite and non-elite participants, and they have done so in controlled experiments and with 
data from lived experience.104  
 
102 See, e.g., Tali Mendelberg, Christopher F. Karpowiz and J. Baxter Oliphant, Gender 
Inequality in Deliberation: Unpacking the Black Box of Interaction, 12 PERSPECTIVES ON 
POLITICS 18, 18 (2014) (hereinafter Black Box) (quoting scholars who argue that “‘critical mass 
theory is both problematic and under-theorized,’ its mechanism ‘unspecified’ and the power of 
small numbers of women ‘neglected’”); Tali Mendelberg and Christopher F. Karpowitz, Power, 
Gender, and Group Discussion, 37 ADVANCES IN POL. PSYCH. (Supp. 1) 23, 23 (2016) 
(hereinafter Group Discussion).  
 
103 Mendelberg, Karpowitz and Oliphant, Black Box, supra note 113, at 20. See id. (“The 
more that the features of the decision-making process signal and emphasize women’s status in 
the decision-making, that is, the more authoritative representation the process provides to 
women, the more symbolic and substantive representation women will have as a consequence.”); 
Christopher F. Karpowitz, Tali Mendelberg and Lauren Mattioli, Why Women’s Numbers 
Elevate Women’s Influence, and When They do Not: Rules, Norms, and Authority in Political 
Discussion, 3 POLITICS, GROUPS, AND IDENTITIES 149, 150, 158 (2015) (hereinafter Women’s 
Numbers).   
104 See CHRISTOPHER F. KARPOWITZ AND TALI MENDELBERG, THE SILENT SEX: GENDER, 
DELIBERATION, AND INSTITUTIONS (2014); Tali Mendelberg, Christopher Karpowitz and Lee 
Shaker, Gender Inequality in Deliberative Participation, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 533 (2012); 
Mendelberg, Karpowitz and Oliphant, Black Box, supra note 113; Tali Mendelberg, Nicholas 
Goedert and Christopher Karpowitz, Does descriptive representation Encourage Women to 
deliberate with a Distinctive Voice?, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 291 (2014); Karpowitz, Mendelberg and 
Mattioli, Women’s Numbers, supra note 100; Tali Mendelberg, Christopher F. Karpowitz and 
Lauren Mattioli, Gender and Women’s Influence in Public Settings, in EMERGING TRENDS IN THE 
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This institutional perspective enabled another key insight: achieving authoritative and 
substantive representation sometimes requires institutional help, such as a decision rule requiring 
unanimity rather than a simple majority. Research has shown that, at least in some settings, a 
decision rule requiring a simple majority is inimical to the ability of women to exercise a fair 
share of influence when they are in the minority, a disadvantage that continues in some contexts 
until women constitute a majority (or even a super-majority).105  Empirical research suggests two 
distinct (but obviously related) mechanisms that may explain this pattern.   
 
One concerns how amenable to persuasion a woman’s audience is.  In their award-
winning research, Mendelberg and Karpowitz find that under majority rule in an experimental 
context, when women are in the minority they are treated as having less authority, are accorded 
less respect in the deliberative process, and are less likely to be perceived as making influential 
contributions, as compared to when they are in the majority.  The authors detect no 
corresponding reductions for males on these dimensions when they move from majority to 
minority.106  A reasonable reading of this research is that, holding constant the substance of a 
woman’s contributions, she will be more likely to persuade others and affect outcomes when in 
the majority.   
 
An alternative or supplementary mechanism concerns how the deliberative context 
affects the substance of women’s contributions.  Mendelberg and Karpowitz find—again, under 
majority rule in an experimental context—that women in the minority are less likely to express 
their sincere preferences as compared to when they are in the majority.107 The authors see this 
 
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1 (Robert Scott & Stephen Kosslyn, eds. 2015) (hereinafter 
Women’s Influence); Mendelberg and Karpowitz, Group Discussion, supra note 99; Tali 
Mendelberg and Christopher F. Karpowitz, Women’s Authority in Political Decision-Making 
Groups, 27 LEADERSHIP Q. 487 (2016) (hereinafter Political Decision-Making Groups); Pamela 
Ban, et al., A Woman’s Voice in the House: Gender Composition and its Consequences in 
Committee Hearings (Dec. 10, 2018) (hereinafter A Woman’s Voice), available at 
 
105 See Mendelberg, Karpoweitz and Mattioli, Women’s Influence, supra note 115, at 4-5, 
7.  
 
106 See Mendelberg, Karpowitz and Oliphant, Black Box, supra note 113, at 25-29.  The 
authors’ measures of treating a person with authority and respect during a deliberative decision-
making process were based on the frequency of interruptions and the negative or positive valence 
of the language used by those interrupting.  Perceived influence was measured based on 
questioning participants after the group decision process ended.    
 
107 See Mendelberg and Karpowitz, Political Decision-Making Groups, supra note 115, at 
497 (“In other words, when empowered by the group context, women not only spoke more, they 
also spoke differently … We found that when women were outnumbered by men under majority 
rule, they were dramatically more likely to advocate for principles other than the ones they 
privately preferred.”); Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Mattioli, Women’s Numbers, supra note 114, 
at 168. 
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outcome as tied to women being treated as less authoritative, less deserving of respect, and less 
influential when in the minority.108              
 
The relationship of these theories to our research is speculative and, given the cloistered 
context of appellate judicial decision making, they are not easily tested by quantitative or 
qualitative research.  We are mindful of the hazards of transposing to decision making on the 
Courts of Appeals a theory previously tested in quite different contexts.109 That said, the 
potential explanatory power of this theory should not be rejected based on the notion that gender 
bias, even unconscious gender bias, is not plausibly operative in Court of Appeals decision 
making.  We suspect that few men would have thought that female advocates experience gender 
bias during oral arguments in the Supreme Court.  Yet, recent research shows that they do.110  
More to the point, recent research also shows that female justices themselves experience 
gendered behavior (through interruptions) by both their male colleagues and male advocates 
during oral arguments at higher rates than male justices.111 Still more recent research, confined to 
 
 
108 See Mendelberg and Karpowitz, Political Decision-Making Groups, supra note 115, at 
498-99. 
  
109 See Ban et al., A Woman’s Voice, supra note 115, at 6 (“we are cautious when 
applying theory and findings with respect to non-elites to [a study of discussion dynamics in 
congressional hearings]”); id. at 7-8 (noting adjustments necessary given focus on discussion, not 
deliberation); Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Mattioli, Women’s Numbers, supra note 100, at 161 
(“Thus, the effect of numbers on women’s authority – and more broadly the political psychology 
of gendered participation – cannot be understood apart from careful attention to the interaction of 
the social identity of the members and the rules under which the group comes together.”). Note, 
however, that Karpoowitz and Mendelberg replicated a number of their key findings in an 
experimental setting by analyzing officials’ speech during school board meetings. See 
KARPOWITZ AND MENDELBERG, supra note 115, at 273-304 (“Gender Inequality in School 
Boards”).  
 
110 See Dana Patton and Joseph L. Smith, Lawyer, Interrupted: Gender Bias in Oral 
Arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court, J. LAW & COURTS 337 (Fall 2017) (finding that female 
lawyers are interrupted earlier, allowed to speak for less time between interruptions, and 
subjected to more and longer interventions by justices compared to male lawyers). The authors 
also find that, unlike male lawyers, female lawyers do not enjoy the benefit of being treated more 
deferentially (more time to first interruption, and less frequent interruption) when they represent 
the winning side. See id. at 352. However, they find that this pattern disappears (becomes 
statistically insignificant) in oral arguments in cases involving gender-related issues. See id.  
 
111 See Tonja Jacobi and Dylan Schweers, Justice Interrupted : The Effect of Gender, 
Ideology, and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 103 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1482 (2017) 
(“Our findings clearly establish that women on the Supreme Court are interrupted at a markedly 
higher rate during oral arguments than men. Additionally, both male justices and male advocates 
interrupt women more frequently than they interrupt other men.”).  
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interruptions by justices, finds that “female justices speak significantly less when interrupted by 
male justices.”112 
This work on gender may shed light on why patterns of gender panel effects in our class 
action data differ from those found in employment discrimination cases.  In the latter area, 
researchers concluded that the presence of one female did significantly influence the male 
majority, an effect that they thought may be explained by male judges taking “cues” from 
females who they perceived (based on gender) as more expert or informed.113  If this account of 
the mechanism is correct, female judges in employment discrimination cases may be perceived 
by male judges as more, rather than less, authoritative.114  Why does the one-female panel effect 
disappear when we shift to class certification decisions?      
 
In the domain of class certification, in contrast with employment discrimination, there is 
no reason to anticipate that male judges will take cues from female judges based on their gender.  
In that domain a female judge is no longer empowered to sway her male colleagues’ votes by her 
gender and the perspectives and experience it is presumed to entail.  If the dynamics identified 
by Mendelberg, Karpowitz and their colleagues are at play, it could suggest several possibilities.  
One is that a female judge in the minority who vigorously advocates for a preferred outcome is 
less successful because, as a panel minority in a domain that does not elicit gender-based 
deference, she is regarded as less authoritative and influential.115  Another is that the 
 
 112 See Adam Feldman & Rebecca D. Gill, Power Dynamics in Supreme Court Oral 
Arguments: the Relationship between Gender and Justice-to-Justice Interruptions, 40 JUS. SYS.J. 
173, 188 (2019).   
 
113 See Peresie, supra note 7, at 1783–84; Boyd, Epstein, and Martin, supra note 3, at 
392.  This also seems consistent with the finding of Patton and Smith, supra note 107, that 
although female lawyers do not enjoy the benefit of being treated more deferentially in oral 
arguments when they represent the winning side (as male lawyers are), this pattern disappears in 
cases involving gender-related issues. 
 
114 In a brief discussion of judicial decision making as “[o]ne civic setting where the 
effect of group composition can be seen clearly,” two scholars who have been at the forefront of 
recent gender gap research summarize a few panel effects studies finding that “when judicial 
panels include at least one woman, the panel is more likely to take a pro-plaintiff position.” 
Mendelberg and Karpowitz, Political Decision-Making Groups, supra note 115, at 493. They 
conclude that “at least with respect to some issues, small individual-level differences between 
men and women may be amplified by the gender context of the group, and women’s presence in 
group decision making can affect the group’s outcome.” Id. See also KARPOWITZ AND 
MENDELBERG, supra note 115, at 339-40; Mendelberg, Karpowitz and Mattioli, Women’s 
Influence, supra note 115, at 10 (“more remains to be done to understand the mechanisms of 
these gender composition effects or the processes by which judges interact”). 
 
115 Interpreting an interview with Justice Ginsburg, Adam Liptak observed: “But Justice 
Ginsburg said her own influence in all sorts of cases at the justices’ conferences was uncertain. ‘I 
will say something – and I don’t think I’m a confused speaker – and it isn’t until somebody else 
says it that everyone will focus on the point,’ Justice Ginsburg said.” Adam Liptak, The Waves 
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reinforcement of a female majority increases her propensity to advocate preferences that differ 
systematically from those of her male colleagues in areas without obvious gender salience, such 
as class certification.116  We are aware of no research that explores the issues we have been 
discussing as applied to race rather than gender.   
 
Conclusion  
 
 In this article we have undertaken the first empirical analysis (as far as we are aware) of 
how potentially salient characteristics of Court of Appeals judges and panels influence class 
certification decisions under Rule 23.  We find that the party of the appointing president has a 
very strong association with Court of Appeals judges’ votes on certification, with all-Democratic 
panels having dramatically higher rates of certification than all-Republican panels—nearly triple 
in about the past twenty years. Our findings on race and gender panel effects show that these 
identity characteristics of judges also matter significantly to certification.  We are aware of no 
prior study that reports both gender and race panel effects in a policy domain.  Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, our results show that diversity on the bench is consequential to lawmaking 
beyond policy areas conventionally thought to be of particular concern to women and racial 
minorities, which constitute a relatively narrow band of substantive law.   
 
In seeking an explanation for the pro-certification preferences of female and African 
American judges, we note that class action doctrine is a form of trans-substantive procedural law 
that traverses many policy areas. Whether or not as a result of strategic judicial behavior, the 
effects of gender and racial diversity on the bench through certification radiate widely across the 
legal landscape, influencing implementation of consumer, securities, labor and employment, 
antitrust, insurance, product liability, and environmental law, among many other areas.  The 
results highlight how the consequences of diversity extend beyond conceptions of “women’s 
issues” or “minority issues.”  The results also suggest the importance of exploring the effects of 
diversity on trans-substantive procedural law more generally.   
 
Our findings on gender panel effects in particular are novel in the literature on panel 
effects and the literature on gender and judging.  Past work focusing on substantive anti-
discrimination law found that one woman can influence the votes of males in the majority 
(mirroring what we find with respect to African American judges in class certification decisions).  
 
Minority Judges Always Make, NY TIMES (May 31, 2009), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/31/weekinreview/31liptak.html  
 
116 On the latter view, female judges may be “respond[ing] to situations that signal to 
them that they have power by accelerating their participation and to situations that signal their 
powerlessness by decreasing their participation.” Mendelberg and Karpowitz, Group Discussion, 
supra note 113, at 26. Cf. Mendelberg, Karpowitz and Oliphant, Black Box, supra note 113, at 24 
(“Gender composition shifts the tone of men’s direct engagement with women from clearly 
negative to highly positive. But it does so only under majority rule.”); id. at 27 (“Similarly, we 
now understand why majority rule is bad for minority women – they seldom hear encouragement 
when they speak.”). This perspective does not suggest that women are more influenced by 
signals about their power than men, but rather that they receive different signals.     
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These results allowed for optimism that the panel structure—which threatens to dilute the 
influence of minority groups on the bench—actually facilitates minority influence, whether 
through deliberation, cue taking, bargaining, or some other mechanism.  Although the 
mechanism remained a mystery, it was clear that panels were not operating in a simple 
majoritarian fashion that trounced minority views.     
 
Our gender results are quite different and normatively troubling.  We observe that female 
judges have more pro-certification preferences based on their votes when in the majority.  
However, women are not more likely to vote in favor of certification when they are the panel 
minority; men sitting with women are not more likely to do so when they are in the majority, and 
such cases are not more likely to yield pro-certification outcomes.  Only when women are in the 
majority do we observe notably elevated votes for certification by both women in the majority 
and men in the minority, yielding a higher rate of pro-certification outcomes.  Female majority 
panels occur at sharply lower rates than women’s percentage of judgeships.   
 
In seeking to identify a mechanism that may explain these results, we consider a number 
of admittedly speculative possibilities. One is that male judges have intense and entrenched 
views on certification, making their votes exceptionally difficult to influence. Several others are 
illuminated by recent scholarship on the gender gap and critical mass theory. One is that in the 
domain of class certification, unlike that of employment discrimination, a female judge is not 
empowered to sway her male colleagues’ votes by her gender and the perspectives and 
experience it is presumed to entail.  A female judge in the minority who advocates for a preferred 
outcome is less successful because, as a panel minority in such a domain, she is regarded as less 
authoritative and influential.  Another is that the reinforcement of a female majority increases her 
propensity to advocate preferences that differ systematically from those of her male colleagues in 
areas without obvious gender salience, such as class certification. 
 
 Finally, the majoritarian structure of the gender panel results counsels caution in the 
interpretation of prior work purporting to find that gender is consequential to Court of Appeals 
decision making only in rare circumstances.  That work has been based largely on sample sizes 
too small to evaluate majority-female panels, or it simply did not evaluate them.  Null results that 
do not isolate votes and outcomes when women are in a panel majority cannot foreclose the 
existence of large differences in preferences along gender lines, and they may reflect suppression 
of women’s influence.   
 
Although we find that the presence of one African American is associated with elevated 
rates of pro-certification votes and outcomes, we nevertheless believe that our gender results also 
counsel caution as to interpretation of null results associated with any minority judge 
characteristic (including race) in models that do not isolate votes and outcomes when the group 
is in the majority.  Scholars understand little about mechanisms that underpin panel effects, and 
about when and why gender and race are associated with variation in judges’ preferences across 
different substantive domains.  It would be foolish to assume that the panel dynamics we observe 
with respect to gender in class certification decisions will never be present with respect to race in 
another field of law.    
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APPENDIX 
 
Part I.A 
 
We began by identifying every decision classified by the Westlaw headnote system as 
addressing any class action issue (there are 33 such headnotes) from 1966 to 2017.  This yielded 
over 2,000 cases.  Each case was read by a coder to determine if the court addressed whether to 
certify a class under Rule 23, and if so, the case was included in our data if published.  We 
identified 1142 such cases, the first of which was decided in 1967.   
 
 With respect to unpublished cases, our goal was to identify years in which all 
unpublished cases were available so as to create a dataset that was not vulnerable to selection 
bias as a result of studying only published decisions or some but not all unpublished decisions.  
By 2002, with the exception of the 5th and 11th Circuits, the full text of all unpublished cases was 
provided to Westlaw and included in the Federal Appendix, and West published these opinions 
in the same manner as ordinary published opinions in that “West’s attorneys assigned headnotes, 
topics, and key numbers” to the cases.117  The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ unpublished opinions 
became consistently available in 2003 and 2005, respectively.118  However, we observed that 
some unpublished summary dispositions of appeals of certification decisions lack sufficient legal 
discussion to receive headnote classifications.  We used word searches to identify these cases 
and added them to the data.  For the circuit-years in which all unpublished cases are available—
2003-2017 for the 5th, 2005-17 for the 11th, and 2002-17 for the rest—we identified 208 
unpublished cases in which the court ruled on whether a class should be certified under Rule 23.   
 
 This produced a total of 1,350 published and unpublished cases.  From here we lost 67 
cases due to missing values on some variable in the model.  This was because the outcome 
variable on the Court of Appeals could not be characterized as a plaintiff or defendant win (37 
cases); likewise for the direction of the district court decision (19 cases); there were missing 
votes because an originally assigned judge became unavailable before the case was decided 
(such as by death) and it was disposed of by the remaining two (10 cases); and one case had a 
missing value on the law-type variables.      
 
Part I.B 
 
 In all of the statistical models reported below, the following control variables are 
included: 
 
• Trial court outcome: Indicator variable reflecting whether the trial court certified the 
class (or portion of the class) that is under consideration by the Court of Appeals.   
 
117 Andrew T. Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for 
Ethical Problems & Legal Malpractice?, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 205–06 (2007). 
 
118 Id. 
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• Trial judge sitting by designation: Indicator variable recording whether a judge was a 
trial judge sitting by designation in the individual-level model (Table A-1), or whether 
there was a trial judge sitting by designation on the panel in the panel-level and outcome 
models (Tables A-2 and A-3).119   
• Defendant type: Non-mutually exclusive indicator variables measuring whether 
certification was sought with respect to a federal defendant, state defendant, business 
defendant, or other type of defendant.   
• Law type: Mutually exclusive indicator variables measuring whether certification was 
sought for claims arising under federal law, state law, or both. 
• Class type: Mutually exclusive indicator variables measuring whether certification was 
sought for a plaintiff class, a defendant class, or both.   
• Policy area: Mutually exclusive indicator variables reflecting policy area.  Our policy 
classifications are: civil rights-discrimination, civil rights-other, labor and employment, 
consumer, product liability, environmental and toxic substances, antitrust, securities, 
insurance, and public benefits.  Remaining policy areas each comprised less than two 
percent of the data, and we aggregated them into an “other” policy category. 
• Certification versus decertification: Indicator variable recording whether the court was 
deciding a motion to certify or a motion to decertify. 
• Interlocutory: Indicator variable measuring whether the appeal of the certification 
decision was interlocutory.   
• Circuit fixed effects: Circuit fixed effects (dummy variables for each circuit) account for 
any time-varying covariates that take the same value for each judge on a panel within the 
circuit.   
• Year fixed effects: Year fixed effects (dummy variables for each year) account for any 
time-varying covariates that take the same value for each judge on a panel within the 
year.   
 
 
  
 
119 We say “trial judge” rather than district judge because judges from the Court of 
Claims and the International Court of Trade also sit by designation.  In alternative specifications, 
we also examined models with a control for any judge not from the circuit that decided the case, 
including both trial judges and visiting appellate judges, and this difference had no material 
effect on the results we report.    
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Part I.C 
 
 
Table A-1: Logit Model of Panel Effects in Certification Outcomes 
 
  Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D    
  1967-2017 1967-94  1995-2017 2002-17   
  Published  Published  Published All Cases         
 
Democrat . .53***  .42***  .58***  .58**    
   (.08)  (.12)  (.12)  (.12)    
Female   .17  .09  .20  .23      
   (.12)  (.27)  (.13)  (.12)     
African American .27  .36  .42  .32    
   (.17)  (.25)  (.22)  (.19)    
  
All models include circuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, and independent variables measuring policy area, 
direction of the trial court outcome, trial judge sitting by designation, defendant type (federal government, state 
government, business, other), law type (federal law, state law, both), type of class for which certification was sought 
(plaintiff, defendant, both), whether the motion was for certification or decertification, and whether the appeal was 
interlocutory.  Model D additionally contains a variable indicating whether the case was published. 
 
 
N=   3,283  1,732   1,534  1,769  
Pseudo R2=  .15  .23  .14  .19 
***p < .01; **p < 05  
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Table A-2: Logit Model of Panel Effects in Certification Outcomes 
 
 Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D   Model E  Model F 
 1967-2017 1967-94  1995-2017 2002-17  2002-17  2002-17 
 Published  Published  Published All Cases       All Cases  All Cases   
         No Discrim           No Civ Rts 
      PARTY 
3 Republicans (reference)  
 
1 Dem, 2 Rep .48**  .62  .22  -.07  -.13  -.02  
  (.22)  (.36)  (.31)  (.33)  (.34)  (.39) 
2 Rep, 1 Rep 1.00***  1.12***  .89***  .94***    .81**  1.05*** 
  (.23)  (.38)  (.34)  (.35)   (.37)  (.41) 
3 Dem   1.12***  .91**  1.31**  1.31***  1.28**  1.82*** 
  (.31)  (.46)  (.53)  (.49)  (.51)  (.56) 
      GENDER 
3 Males (reference) 
 
1 Fem, 2 Male  .17  .18  .22  .12  .07  .03  
  (.19)  (.37)  (.25)  (.25)  (.26)  (.28) 
2 Fem, 1 Male  .87**  1.71  .92**  .87***    .89***  .72** 
  (.34)  (1.57)  (.37)  (.33)  (.34)  (.36) 
3 Fem  ___  ___  ___  -1.53  -1.67  -1.68 
         (1.34)  (1.36)  (1.37) 
      RACE 
All White/Other (reference) 
 
1 Af Am, 2 W/O .50**  .42  .84***  .72***  .74**  .79** 
  (.22)  (.37)  (.31)  (.28)  (.29)  (.32) 
2 Af Am, 1 W/O .06  2.14  -.37  -.30    -.38  -.26 
  (.77)  (1.66)  (.89)  (.79)   (.82)  (.98) 
3 Af Am  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___ 
 
All models include circuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, and independent variables measuring policy area, 
direction of the trial court outcome, trial judge sitting by designation, defendant type (federal government, state 
government, business, other), law type (federal law, state law, both), type of class for which certification was sought 
(plaintiff, defendant, both), whether the motion was for certification or decertification, and whether the appeal was 
interlocutory.  Models D, E, and F additionally contain a variable indicating whether the case was published. 
 
 
N=  1080  567   506  585  527  461  
Pseudo R2= .17  .25  .18  .23  .23  .23 
***p < .01; **p < 05  
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Table A-3: Logit Model of Panel Effects in Certification Votes 
 
    Model A  Model B Model C 
    1995-2017  2002-2017 2002-2017 
    Published  All Cases  All Cases, No Civil Rights 
       PARTY 
Rep voting with 2Rs (reference) 
 
Rep voting with 1R & 1D    .21    -.09  -.01    
     (.28)   (.31)  (.35) 
Dem voting with 2Rs   .56   .21    .28 
     (.29)   (.31)  (.35)   
Rep voting with 2Ds    .52   .75**  .97** 
     (.32)   (.33)  (.38) 
Dem voting with 1D & 1R   .92***   1.01***  1.09*** 
     (.32)   (.33)  (.38) 
Dem voting with 2Ds (All Dem)  1.34**   1.32***   1.83*** 
     (.53)   (.48)   (.55) 
       GENDER 
Male voting with 2 Ms (reference)  
 
Male voting with 1M & 1F   .27   .12  -.01   
     (.23)   (.24)  (.27) 
Fem voting with 2Ms   .19   .08    .03 
     (.23)   (.24)   (.27) 
Male voting with 2Fs    .98***   .99***  .82** 
     (.37)   (.31)  (.34) 
Fem voting with 1M & 1F   .89**   .89***  .72** 
     (.37)   (.31)  (.34) 
Fem voting with 2Fs   ___   -1.64  -1.72 
        (1.49)  (1.42) 
       RACE 
White/Other voting with 2 WOs (reference) 
 
White/Other voting with 1WO & 1AA  .72***   .66***  .78***   
     (.27)   (.24)  (.28)  
African Am voting with 2WOs  .76***   .72***  .76***    
     (.28)   (.25)  (.29)   
White/Other voting with 2AAs   -.93   -.86  -.34  
     (.78)   (.61)  (.79)  
African Am voting with 1AA & 1WO  -.38   -.64  -.66  
     (.80)   (.61)  (.79)   
African Am voting with 2AAs  ___   ___  ___ 
 
All models include circuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, and independent variables measuring policy area, 
direction of the trial court outcome, trial judge sitting by designation, defendant type (federal government, state 
government, business, other), law type (federal law, state law, both), type of class for which certification was sought 
(plaintiff, defendant, both), whether the motion was for certification or decertification, and whether the appeal was 
interlocutory.  Models B and C additionally contain a variable indicating whether the case was published. 
 
N=     1,520    1,755  1,383    
Pseudo R2=    .17   .23  .23 
***p < .01; **p < 05  
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on case 
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Table A-4: Predicted Probabilities of Pro-Certification Votes  
for Party, Gender, and Race-Panel Combinations 
 
    Model A Model B Model C 
    1995-2017 2002-2017 2002-2017 
    Published All Cases  All Cases, No Civil Rights 
 
“___” indicates that panel type is not statistically distinguishable from the reference category (in italics).   
** Indicates no cases in model. 
       PARTY 
 
Rep voting with 2Rs   23%  20%  17% 
 
Rep voting with 1R & 1D  ___  ___  ___ 
 
Dem voting with 2Rs   ___  ___  ___ 
       
Rep voting with 2Ds    ___  48%  54% 
      
Dem voting with 1D & 1R   55%  50%  53%  
      
Dem voting with 2Ds   65%  58%  67% 
 
       GENDER 
 
Male voting with 2 Ms    31%  27%  30% 
 
Male voting with 1M & 1F  ___  ___  ___   
 
Fem voting with 2Ms   ___  ___  ___ 
  
Male voting with 2Fs    59%  53%  52% 
     
Fem voting with 1M & 1F   57%  51%  50% 
 
Fem voting with 2Fs   **  ___  ___ 
 
 
       RACE 
 
White/Other voting with 2WOs  38%  34%  36%  
 
White/Other voting with 1WO & 1AA 53%  47%  50% 
     
African Am voting with 2WOs  55%  48%  51% 
       
White/Other voting with 2AAs   ___  ___  ___ 
      
African Am voting with 1AA & 1WO  ___  ___  ___ 
       
African Am voting with 2AAs  **  **  ** 
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Part II 
 
An individual vote-level model of panel effects requires that we disaggregate the party, 
gender, and race variables.  Our approach is to create variables that capture the identity of the 
voting judge and the characteristics of her colleagues on the panel. This requires that each 
variable measuring a characteristic (party, gender, race), be disaggregated into six variables.  
Table A-5 defines each of the six variables associated with party, gender, and race panel effects.  
Although the table is labored, the information is necessary in order to understand the textured 
information conveyed by the regression models.  For each set of indicator variables, we 
designate the reference category with the “REF” parenthetical.           
 
Table A-5: Panel Variables for Party, Gender, and Race             
  
Variable Description      Variable Name 
 
Republican Majority Panels 
 
Republican voting, with 2 other Republicans (REF) All Reps 
Republican voting, with 1 Republican & 1 Democrat   Rep voting with 1R & 1D  
Democrat voting, with 2 Republicans   Dem voting with 2Rs   
 
Democratic Majority Panels 
 
Republican voting, with 2 Democrats   Rep voting with 2Ds   
Democrat voting, with 1 Democrat & 1 Republican  Dem voting with 1D & 1R   
Democrat voting, with 2 other Democrats   All Dems   
 
     Male Majority Panels 
 
Male voting, with 2 other Males (REF)   All Male  
Male voting, with 1 Male & 1 Female    Male voting with 1M & 1F  
Female voting, with 2 Males    Fem voting with 2Ms   
 
  Female Majority Panels  
 
Male voting, with 2 Females    Male voting with 2Fs   
Female voting, with 1 Female & 1 Male   Fem voting with 1F & 1M   
Female voting, with 2 other Females   All Female   
 
  White/Other Majority Panels  
 
White/Other voting, with 2 other White/Others (REF) All WO   
White/Other voting, with 1 White/Other & 1 African Am  White/Other voting with 1WO & 1AA  
African Am voting, with 2 White/Others   African Am voting with 2WOs  
   
  African American Majority Panels  
 
White/Other voting, with 2 African Ams   White voting with 2AAs   
African Am voting, with 1 African Am & 1 White/Other African Am voting with 1AA & 1WO  
African Am voting, with 2 other African Ams  All African Am 
 
 
 
 51 
II.A Party 
 
We replicated all of the models in Table A-2, but with the individual-level panel 
variables substituted for the case-level variables, and the results we observe are entirely 
consistent with the outcome models in terms of both significance and magnitude.  We focus here 
on models that we regard as most significant.  Table A-3 presents vote-level models of published 
cases in 1995-2017 (Model A), all published and unpublished cases in 2002-2017 (Model B), 
and published and unpublished cases in 2002-2017 after excluding all discrimination and other 
civil rights claims (Model C). Using these model results, we computed predicted probabilities of 
votes to certify for each of the judge party-panel combinations that were statistically 
distinguishable from votes on all-Republican panels, and they are displayed in Table A-3 (Part 
I.C of this Appendix).  Not surprisingly in light of 98% unanimity in the cases, they look very 
similar to case outcome probabilities.  The switch from a Republican voting on an all-Republican 
panel to a Democrat voting on an all-Democratic panel is dramatic.  The probability of a pro-
certification vote grows by 42 percentage points in the 1995-2017 model of published cases, 38 
in the 2002-17 model of published and unpublished cases, and a striking 50 in the same model 
but after excluding discrimination and other civil rights claims.  Mixed panels have levels of pro-
certification voting between these two poles.   
 
Also consistent with the outcome models in 1995-2017, in all three vote-level models the 
panels are symmetrically majoritarian.  The insignificance of Rep voting with 1R & 1D shows 
that a single Democrat fails to discernably affect the votes of Republicans in the panel majority 
relative to how they vote on all-Republican panels.  In alternative specifications leaving out all-
Democratic panels as the reference, we likewise observe that a single Republican fails to affect 
the votes of Democrats in the panel majority relative to how they vote on all-Democratic panels.   
 
II.B Gender 
 
For the gender-panel variables, a male voting on an all-male panel is the reference 
category.  Controlling for partisan and racial panel composition, and the variables listed in Part 
I.B of the Appendix, the variable capturing the votes of male judges serving on a panel with one 
female (Male voting with 1M & 1F) is insignificant in all three models, indicating that they are 
no more likely to vote for certification than when serving on an all-male panel.  Likewise, the 
variable capturing a female sitting with two males (Fem voting with 2Ms) is insignificant in all 
three models, indicating that they are no more likely to vote for certification than a male serving 
on an all-male panel.  These two variables capture the same panels (with two males and one 
female) and separately measure votes of male and female panel members, showing that neither is 
statistically distinguishable from the votes of males on all-male panels.  
 
In sharp contrast, when there are two females on a panel, the variable measuring the vote 
of the male serving with them (Male voting with 2Fs) is statistically significant, positive, and 
large in magnitude, indicating that males on such panels are materially more likely to vote for 
certification as compared to when serving with two other males.  Likewise, the variable 
measuring the vote of a female serving on a panel with one other female (Fem with 1F & 1M) is 
statistically significantly larger than the votes of males on all-male panels.  These two variables 
capture the same panels (with two females and one male) and separately measure the votes of 
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male and female panel members, showing that both are materially more likely to vote to certify 
than a male on an all-male panel.  On these panels male and female judges vote in a pro-
certification direction at an almost identical rate, which is consistent with the high level of 
unanimity in the data.  The predicted probabilities displayed in Table A-4 (Part I.C of this 
Appendix) show that the effect sizes are extremely similar to those associated with panels with 
two females in the outcome model.  The switch from a male voting on an all-Male panel to a 
Male (Female) voting on a panel with two female judges is associated with a growth in the 
probability of a pro-certification vote by 28 (26) percentage points in the 1995-2017 model of 
published cases, 26 (24) in the 2002-17 model of published and unpublished cases, and 22 (20) 
in the same model but after excluding discrimination and other civil rights claims. 
 
In order to assess the relationship between gender panel composition and dissenting 
behavior, we ran the models in Table A-2, Models A and B, but substituting a variable indicating 
when a judge dissented as the dependent variable (not displayed).  All of the gender-panel 
variables (including the one designating a woman in the panel minority) were clearly 
insignificant.  The gender composition of the panel is not associated with the dissenting behavior 
of male or female judges.   
 
II.C Race 
 
Controlling for the partisan and gender composition of the panel, and the variables listed 
in Part I.B of the Appendix, the race panel variables show quite different patterns as compared to 
the gender panel variables, tracking what we observed in the case outcome model.  The variable 
capturing the votes of white/other judges serving on a panel with one African American 
(White/Other voting with 1WO & 1AA) is statistically significant in all three models, indicating 
that they are more likely to vote for certification than when serving on an all-white/other panel.  
Likewise, the variable capturing the votes of an African American sitting with two white/other 
judges (African Am voting with 2WOs) is significant, indicating that they are also more likely to 
vote for certification than a white/other judge serving on an all-white/other panel.  These two 
variables capture the same panels (with one African American and two white/other judges) and 
separately measure votes of the African American and white/other panel members, showing that 
both are statistically distinguishable from the votes of white/other judges on all-white/other 
panels.  The predicted probabilities displayed in Table A-3 (Part I.C of this Appendix) show that 
the effect sizes are extremely similar to those associated with panels with one African American 
in the outcome model.  The switch from a white/other judge voting on an all-white/other panel to 
a white/other (African American) voting on a panel with one African American judge is 
associated with a growth in the probability of a pro-certification vote by 15 (17) percentage  
points in the 1995-2017 model of published cases, 13 (14) in the 2002-17 model of published 
and unpublished cases, and 14 (15) in the same model but after excluding discrimination and 
other civil rights claims.   
  
In contrast, when there are two African American judges on a panel, the variables 
measuring the votes of all judges are statistically indistinguishable from the votes of white/other 
judges on all-white/other panels.  However, there are only 11 such cases in the data.  We simply 
don’t have enough data to provide meaningful estimates of voting under this panel configuration.  
As was true in the outcome models, there are no race panel effects if we pool all non-white 
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judges into a single racial minority category.  The race-panel effects emerge only with respect to 
African American judges.  The presence of one African American on the panel is not associated 
with the dissenting behavior of white/other or African American judges, and we lack the data 
evaluate this with respect to panels with two African Americans.   
 
Part III 
 
In order to evaluate whether female judges from a particular political party have a 
distinctive probability of certification that is not captured by the direct effects of party and 
gender, we examined interactions which isolate specific party-gender combinations.  In the 2002-
17 model of votes in all cases, with gender and race panel effects, we substituted a simple party 
variable for the party-panel variables and interacted it with the panel variables for a female judge 
voting on a panel with one woman, and for a female judge voting on a panel with two women.  
The interactions were insignificant, indicating no positive or negative change in the probability 
of certification associated with female judges from one political party not already captured by the 
direct effects of party and gender.      
 
Likewise, we interacted the party variable with the variable capturing one African 
American judge voting on panels with one African American.  This interaction was also 
insignificant, indicating that neither African American Democrats nor African American 
Republicans had an additional positive or negative probability of certification not captured by the 
direct effects of party and race.  In these models with interactions, the variables for a male and a 
female judge voting on panels with two women, and for a white/other and an African American 
judge voting on panels with one African American, remain significant, positive, and of 
comparable magnitude as in Model B in Table A-3 (with party-panel variables, and without the 
interactions).    
   
In order to evaluate whether African American judges of a particular gender have a 
distinctive probability of certification that is not captured by the direct effects of race and gender, 
we examined interactions which isolate specific race-gender combinations.  In the 2002-17 
model of votes in all cases reported in Model B in Table A-3, we added interactions of the 
variable identifying African American judges voting on a panel with one African American, with 
the variables identifying a female judge voting on panels with one female, and a female judge 
voting on panels with two females.  The interactions were insignificant, indicating no positive or 
negative change in the probability of certification associated with African American judges of a 
particular gender not already captured by the direct effects of race and gender.  However, and 
importantly, there are so few African American female judges in the data that we regard this as 
inconclusive.        
 
